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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION
ESSAYS ON CHILD WELL–BEING AND THE SOCIAL SAFETY NET
This dissertation consists of three essays examining the role of two particular social
safety net programs, the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program
and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), on the well-being of
children from disadvantaged households. While the impact of these programs on
the adults and parents of the household have been studied extensively, less is known
about their effect on children. This is true for both their immediate impact on child
well-being and any long-run impacts on children who grow up under these programs.
Given the demonstrated importance of child well-being on later life adult outcomes,
understanding the lasting effects of the programs is of great policy importance.
In Essay 1, I examine the effect of welfare reform on long-run educational attain-
ment and family structure outcomes on children who grew up under the reformed
welfare system. In the early 1990’s, the United States reformed its welfare system
through state waivers and the TANF program. These changes altered family re-
sources and potential investments for childhood human capital, which in turn could
affect later adult outcomes. Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynam-
ics (PSID) Child Development Supplement (CDS) and the Transition to Adulthood
Supplement (TAS), I examine the short-run effects of welfare reform on cognitive and
noncognitive outcomes and the long-run impact of welfare reform on adult education
and family structure through age 28. I find that as children, these individuals have
higher reading test scores by an average of 6 percent of a standard deviation. As
adults, I find robust evidence that these treated individuals are on average 9 percent
more likely to graduate college. I also find some evidence that they are more likely to
be married and less likely to have a child out of wedlock. The impacts of welfare re-
form are larger for women than men for childhood test scores and college completion,
marriage rates, and out of wedlock births as adults.
In Essay 2, I continue to study the effects of welfare reform on child well-being, here
focusing on the effect of welfare reform on the health insurance coverage, healthcare
utilization, and the health status of children. In addition to changing the overall
resources available to the family to invest in child health, welfare reform also has
specific implications for health insurance coverage. As mothers were moved to work
they could gain private coverage and welfare reform eliminated automatic eligibility
for Medicaid. In this essay, I use data from the PSID CDS. I find a 3-5 percent
decrease in the likelihood that a child has had their annual checkup but no change
to the insurance coverage of children. For health status, I find lower rates of asthma
by 17 percent among African American children and an increase of 3-5 healthy days
a year for all children. I present suggestive evidence that the improvements in child
health are driving the reduction in healthcare utilization. Given the evidence in the
literature on the importance of childhood health, these improvements have potentially
large ramifications for future adult health.
Finally, in Essay 3 I explore the effect of the real purchasing power of SNAP
benefits for households with children on dietary quality of food acquisitions and food
insecurity. SNAP, formerly food stamps, is one of the most important components
of the social safety net. However, there is concern that benefits are inadequate given
high food insecurity rates among participating households. Currently SNAP does not
account for variation in local food prices and does not sufficiently consider the dietary
needs of adolescent children. Using data from the Food Acquisition and Purchase Sur-
vey (FoodAPS), I exploit variation in county level food prices and family composition
to estimate the purchasing power of food expenditures for SNAP and SNAP–eligible
households to test for the effect of additional benefits on dietary quality and food
security. I find that a ten percent increase in purchasing power is associated with
increased per person weekly acquisition of grains, proteins, dairy, and vegetables by
1.5-2.5 percent. However the quantity of added sugars also increases by approximately
two percent, suggesting an ambiguous impact on health. In line with these modest
changes in quantity, I do not find a statistically significant impact of purchasing power
on food insecurity rates.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
The social safety net in the United States is a collection of multiple welfare pro-
grams designed to catch Americans if they fall on hard times. The safety net is
comprised of many programs run by different government agencies that provide as-
sistance depending on the particular needs of the individual or family. For adults
who have used the programs, the impact of the safety net both in the short and
long-run has been extensively studied, though research in the area is always ongoing
as programs and rules change. One understudied aspect of the social safety net is the
impact of the programs on child well-being. Many of our safety net programs target
children either directly or indirectly and yet compared to what we know about their
impact on adults, we know comparatively little how they affect children.
The importance of childhood well-being is being shown more and more frequently
across the economics literature. Child well-being covers many facets of a child’s life
but can broadly refer to their physical and mental health, nutrition, education, and
social skills. Early childhood education and home environment can shape their learn-
ing and social behavior affecting their cognitive and noncognitive skills. The child’s
in-utero environment can have lasting impacts on their health which can spillover to
their education and social life as well. These measures matter not only because they
improve the lives of children but also because these childhood traits have significant
effects on adult outcomes as well. “Children are the future” is an oft repeated phase,
but for our country’s disadvantaged children what are we doing to help them not
only now but in the future? Is the social safety net working to alleviate poverty five
or ten years from now? Indeed the most cost effective way to improve future adult
well-being might be to improve the well-being of children today. This dissertation
1
aims to explore for our most vulnerable children, what does the U.S. social safety
net do to improve their well-being? What are we doing today to break the cycle of
inequality tomorrow?
This dissertation consists of three essays examining the role of two particular so-
cial safety net programs. The first is the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families
(TANF) program created by the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Rec-
onciliation Act (PRWORA), more commonly known as welfare reform, which provides
cash assistance to families. The second is the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Pro-
gram (SNAP), formerly known as food stamps, which provides benefits redeemable
towards the purchase of food. Combined these two programs reach more than 20
million households annually and provide assistance to some of our country’s most
vulnerable children. While the impact of these programs on the adults and parents
of the household have been studied extensively, less is known about their effect on
children. This is true for both their immediate impact on child well-being and any
long-run impacts on children who grow up under these programs. Given the demon-
strated importance of child well-being on later life adult outcomes, understanding the
lasting effects of the programs is of great policy importance.
In Essay 1, I examine the effect of welfare reform on long-run educational attain-
ment and family structure outcomes on children who grew up under the reformed
welfare system. In the early 1990’s, the United States reformed its welfare system
through state waivers and the TANF program. These changes altered family resources
and potential investments for childhood human capital, which in turn could affect later
adult outcomes. Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) Child
Development Supplement (CDS) and Transition to Adulthood Supplement (TAS) I
estimate a model of the technology of human capital, or skills production, similar to
the one described by Cunha and Heckman (2007). In this model, skills in the current
2
period are a function of investment in the previous periods. Here, skills as a young
adult are a function of fixed family characteristics, endowment of skills at birth, and
investments made in childhood.
Applying this model to welfare reform, if the change in welfare policies changed
the investment decisions of affected mothers, then those affected children should have
different levels of skills as adults. To motivate the adult outcomes, I first examine if
welfare reform had an effect on childhood cognitive and noncognitive skills. The model
is estimated empirically using a triple difference framework that can accommodate
family fixed effects by exploiting variation in welfare reform timing and likelihood of
TANF participation. I find that at-risk children who were exposed to welfare reform
score higher on reading achievement tests by on average 5-7% of a standard deviation.
Turning to long-run outcomes in the adult sample, I find that these same children
are on average 9 percent more likely to complete college as well as some evidence of
higher rates of marriage and fewer having children out of wedlock, an explicit goal of
the TANF program. Overall, these effects tend to be larger in magnitude for women
than men. For the whole sample, the effect of welfare treatment on higher reading
score and college completion result is robust to the addition of family fixed effects, the
sample of non-movers, and the inclusion of state-time fixed effects. Using an event
study model I find that the first exposure to welfare reform has the largest impact
when the individual is in-utero through the age of one.
In Essay 2, I continue to study the effects of welfare reform on child well-being, here
focusing on the effect of welfare reform on the health insurance coverage, healthcare
utilization, and the health status of children. In addition to changing the overall
resources available to the family to invest in child health, welfare reform also has
specific implications for health insurance coverage. As mothers were moved to work
they could gain private coverage and welfare reform eliminated automatic eligibility
for Medicaid. In this essay, I use data from the PSID CDS. I exploit the variation
3
in the timing of welfare reform by state and the likelihood of TANF participation
to estimate a triple difference model. I find consistent evidence that welfare reform
reduced the likelihood that a child had an annual checkup by 3-5 percent, but find no
change to the insurance coverage of children. For health status, I find lower rates of
asthma by 17 percent among African American children and an increase of 3-5 healthy
days a year for all children. I present suggestive evidence that the improvements in
child health are driving the reduction in healthcare utilization. Given the evidence
in the literature on the importance of childhood health, these improvements have
potentially large ramifications for future adult health.
Finally, in Essay 3 I explore the effect of the real purchasing power of SNAP
benefits for households with children on dietary quality of food acquisitions and food
insecurity. SNAP, formerly food stamps, is one of the most important components
of the social safety net. However, there is concern that benefits are inadequate given
the high food insecurity rates among participating households. Currently, SNAP
does not account for variation in local food prices and does not sufficiently consider
the dietary needs of adolescent children. Using data from the Food Acquisition and
Purchase Survey (FoodAPS), a rich dataset on household food acquisitions and local
prices from April 2012 to January 2013, I exploit variation in county level food prices
and family composition to estimate the purchasing power of food expenditures for
SNAP and SNAP–eligible households to test for the effect of additional benefits on
dietary quality and food security. I find that a ten percent increase in purchasing
power is associated with increased per person weekly acquisition of grains, proteins,
dairy, and vegetables by 1.5-2.5 percent. However the quantity of added sugars also
increases by approximately two percent, suggesting an ambiguous impact on health.
In line with these modest changes in quantity, I do not find a statistically significant
impact of purchasing power on food insecurity rates. Households with adolescents
and single mother households exhibit similar purchasing patterns. The results are
4
robust to an alternative measurement of the local food prices. The findings here
have implications for the public health benefits of SNAP and the purchasing habits
of disadvantaged households with children.
5
Chapter 2: Long-Run Impact of Welfare Reform on Educational Attain-
ment and Family Structure
2.1 Introduction
In the economics literature, there is extensive evidence on the importance of child-
hood well-being on later life outcomes. Events and circumstances in childhood have
lasting effects into adulthood. This relationship has been shown for not only intu-
itively important measures such as childhood health and family income (Case et al.,
2005; Duncan et al., 1998), but also interrelated individual, family, and community
level factors. These factors include early education, neighborhood quality, and the
presence of welfare programs (Heckman et al., 2013; Chetty et al., 2016; Hoynes et al.,
2016). The magnitude and extent of these factors should be an important considera-
tion to policy makers when they are designing and implementing programs that are
targeted for children, particularly if the goal is improving intergenerational mobility.
In this paper I examine one such program that is centered on the wellbeing of
children that has yet to have its long-term impact extensively studied, the Tempo-
rary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program. Implemented in 1996, TANF,
commonly referred to as welfare reform, replaced the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) welfare program. Like its predecessor, TANF provides in-kind and
financial assistance to low income families with children, typically a single mother
household. However, under TANF, individuals now face work requirements, time
limits on assistance, stringent sanctions for noncompliance, and family caps for bene-
fits among other conditions. Policy makers sought to decrease welfare dependency by
moving recipients towards employment by changing the incentives AFDC recipients
faced.
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With the new requirements and stipulations, welfare reform potentially affected
multiple facets of the home environment of children from low-income households. As
mothers are moved to work, this changed their time endowment and possibly their
income available to invest in their children. As shown in the literature, this change
in childhood investment could have a significant impact on later life adult outcomes.
As TANF recently passed the twenty year mark, we can just now begin to study the
long run impacts of welfare reform on the children raised under TANF. This paper
aims to contribute to the emerging literature on the long run effects of the TANF
program and explore potential mechanisms for the effects.
Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) Child Develop-
ment Supplement (CDS) and Transition to Adulthood Supplement (TAS) I estimate
a model of the technology of human capital, or skills production, similar to the one
described by Cunha and Heckman (2007). In this model, skills in the current period
are a function of investment in the previous periods. Here, skills as a young adult are a
function of fixed family characteristics, endowment of skills at birth, and investments
made in childhood. Applying this model to welfare reform, if the change in welfare
policies changed the investment decisions of affected mothers, then those affected chil-
dren should have different levels of skills as adults. To motivate the adult outcomes, I
first examine if welfare reform had an effect on childhood cognitive and noncognitive
skills. The model is estimated empirically using a triple difference framework that
can accommodate family fixed effects by exploiting variation in welfare reform timing
and likelihood of TANF participation.
I contribute to the existing literature on the short-run effects of welfare reform
by showing that at-risk children who were exposed to welfare reform score higher on
reading achievement tests by on average 5-7% of a standard deviation. This paper
is also one of the first to test for the long-run effect of welfare reform on educational
attainment and family structure. I find that these same children are on average 9
7
percent more likely to complete college as well as some evidence of higher rates of
marriage and fewer having children out of wedlock, an explicit goal of the TANF
program. I find that increased usage of formal child care is a likely mechanism for
improvements to childhood cognitive function. Overall, these effects tend to be larger
in magnitude for women than men. For the whole sample, the effect of welfare
treatment on higher reading score and college completion result is robust to the
addition of family fixed effects, the sample of non-movers, and the inclusion of state-
time fixed effects. Using an event study model I find that the first exposure to welfare
reform has the largest impact when the individual is in-utero through the age of one.
2.2 Literature Review
2.2.1 Early Childhood
Early childhood, and even in-utero events, have been shown to have important
effects on an array of later life outcomes, such as health, income, education, and other
aspects of well-being. These childhood events include their health, family income
and socio-economic status, and early education, among others. This section briefly
reviews the literature on the relationship between childhood circumstance and later
life outcomes, and highlights evidence from particular early childhood programs as
well as health and income characteristics more generally.
One of the better known segments of the childhood circumstance literature con-
cerns early childhood education programs such as the Head Start Program, the Perry
Preschool Project, and the Carolina Abecedarian Project, which all sought to pro-
vide high quality child care and education to disadvantaged children. Reanalyzing
the data from the literature, Elango et al. (2015) find, across these programs, last-
ing gains for children that did not have access to another high quality alternative
program. Children in the programs experience higher cognitive function, higher edu-
cational attainment, lower arrest rates, and less welfare usage as adults.
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The long-term effects of education go beyond early childhood education and child
care. The quality of a child’s elementary classes also has persistent effects into adult-
hood. In the late 1980’s, the state of Tennessee randomly assigned one of cohort
children and their teachers into different sized classrooms in grades K-3 within their
school. By linking the experiment data to tax return data, Chetty et al. (2011) are
able to do a thorough longer-term analysis. Individuals assigned to small classroom
sizes were more likely to have attended college. The authors attribute most of the
gain to improvements in the child’s noncognitive ability.
Work has also been done on more general conditions such as the long term effects
of child health and family income/SES. The literature has shown that throughout
all stages of childhood, health plays an important role not only for adult health but
other outcomes as well. This relationship holds even after controlling for a variety
of confounding factors such as income and education as shown by Case et al. (2005).
Looking at a cohort of British adults born in 1958, Case et al. find that having chronic
health conditions as a child leads to worse health as an adult. A similar result is shown
by Currie et al. (2010). Currie et al study 50,000 children born in Manitoba, Canada
between 1979 and 1987, and like Case et al., find that physical health is an important
indicator of young adult health. However, Currie et al. also find that early mental
health problems lead to higher rates of being on social assistance and lower literacy
scores. This relationship between early health and adult outcomes even extends to
in-utero conditions as summarized by Almond and Currie (2011). They show that
the effects of fetal conditions are persistent and that the health effects can remain
latent for many years. For example, fetal conditions such as low birthweight, mother’s
alcohol or smoking usage are linked to heart disease in middle age.
Lastly, and perhaps most apparently is that the family’s income or socioeconomic
status in childhood has lasting implications throughout adulthood. However, given
the endogeneity issues, the causal evidence for this relationship is more limited. Early
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evidence from sibling models, as described in Duncan et al. (1998), shows that chil-
dren who grew up with higher levels of income are more likely to complete more
years of schooling. Other work shows the short-term impact of income by studying
natural experiments that raised family income. Dahl and Lochner (2012) find that
an increase in income, as instrumented by the Earned Income Tax Credit expansion,
improved child achievement test scores. The effect was largest for children from dis-
advantaged households, though the authors don’t explore what could be the potential
mechanisms. Examining the EITC further, Bastian and Michelmore (2018) find that
the long-run impact of exposure to the EITC as a teenager leads to higher educa-
tional attainment and earnings as an adult. They find the primary channel for the
improvement is increases to pre-tax family income.
Given the evidence above, welfare programs then can have potentially large im-
pacts on a child’s later well-being given that they can affect their health, income, or
other facet of their life. There have been recent studies on the long-run effects of
social safety net programs. Brown et al. (2017) study expansions to Medicaid and
the State Children’s Health Insurance Program in the 1980’s and 90’s and find that
children affected by the expansions paid more in taxes, collected less in EITC by
the age of 28. This suggests that increased medical coverage improved child health
and raised their productivity as adults. Hoynes et al. (2016) examine the county-by-
county rollout of the food stamp program in the 1960’s to test if having access to food
stamps as a young child improves adult outcomes. The authors find that when these




Another program whose long term-effects we can now begin to analyze is the
TANF program. TANF was implemented in 1996, and replaced the AFDC welfare
program. AFDC was a federal entitlement program that provided financial assistance
to low income families with children, typically a low-educated single mother house-
hold. In the years prior to PRWORA, welfare caseloads had swelled under AFDC
and starting in 1992 states started seeking and receiving waivers to experiment with
their state welfare program to deal with the rising caseloads.1 PRWORA codified
many of these changes into federal law. PRWORA sought to decrease welfare depen-
dency by moving recipients towards employment by changing the incentives AFDC
recipients faced. Under TANF, individuals now face work requirements, time limits
on assistance, and family caps for benefits among other conditions.
The year that a state first implemented some type of welfare reform, either a
welfare waiver or TANF, is shown in Figure 2.1, with implementation dates taken
from Crouse (1999). Thirty states implemented a major welfare waiver before TANF.
Nineteen of those thirty implemented a waiver in the years before TANF was passed,
1992-1995, with the remaining states implementing either a waiver or TANF in either
1996 or 1997. Though not shown on the map, Hawaii and Alaska implemented welfare
reform in 1997 as well. The last state to implement any kind of reform was New York
in November, 1997. Figure 2.1 also shows the geographic variation in implementation
dates with no region of states all implementing reform at the same time.
As over twenty years have now passed since TANF became law, we can now begin
to study its long-term impacts on the children affected. While much has been written
on the impact of welfare reform on caseloads, employment, and income, relatively
1Politically, rising caseloads appeared to be the motivator for welfare reform, with Bill Clinton
campaigning in 1992 to “end welfare as we know it.” However, Ziliak et al. (2000) show that states
with high caseloads were not more likely to request federal waivers.
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little is known about the long-term effect of welfare reform.2 Early work on this topic
comes from Hartley et al. (2017) who model intergenerational transmission of welfare
use from mother to their daughters before and after welfare reform. They find that
welfare reform attenuated the transmission of dependence by at least one-third.
There are two main channels that PRWORA could affect the cognitive and noncog-
nitive skills of children, which in turn could affect their livelihood as adults. First,
PRWORA could change the income of families. Evidence on this point is somewhat
mixed. Early work by Schoeni and Blank (2000) and Grogger (2003) find modest,
positive effects of welfare reform on earnings, income, and poverty rates. However, the
proceeding work tried to account for the heterogeneity in welfare reform and found
varying effects. Work by Bitler et al. (2006b) and Bollinger et al. (2009) shows that
PRWORA lowered the income of less skilled mothers in the bottom half of the income
distribution and raised income among more skilled mothers. As outlined above, and
by work such as Duncan et al. (2014), income can affect family stress at home. The
stress itself is cognitively draining and any stress from the parents may spill over
into harsher parenting practices, which could alter the child’s personality traits. Less
income also means less resources to invest into the children such as high quality child
care, education, and other learning experiences.
The second avenue for PRWORA to affect childhood mental traits is the time
endowment of the mother. In many states’ TANF programs, adults must be engaged
in an acceptable work activity, commonly defined as participation in the paid work-
force and usually 20-30 hours per week. In addition, states have the option to levy a
sanction equal to all or part of the welfare benefit on those who fail to comply with
the work requirements. As PRWORA moved mothers to work, they have less time
to spend with their children and may choose low-quality child care as a substitute.
2See Blank (2002) & Ziliak (2016b) for excellent reviews on this literature.
12
However, it is possible that attachment to work could increase the subjective well-
being of mothers as found by Herbst (2013). This increase in subjective well-being
could spillover to the child. Therefore, the effect of welfare reform on child cognitive
development is unclear.
The evidence on welfare reform and child mental attributes is slightly mixed.
Morris et al. (2009) examine the relationship between welfare reform and the achieve-
ment scores of children using 7 different welfare experiments carried out across the
United States in the 1990’s. For young children, those aged five or less, the programs
that were the most effective were the ones that not only boosted employment of the
mother but also raised income through an earnings supplement. Young children in
these programs saw an increase in their achievement tests by 7 percent of a standard
deviation. There was no statistically significant impact for children between 6-9 and
a slight negative effect for children older than 10.
Heflin and Acevedo (2011) use panel data from the Fragile Families and Child
Well-being Study to examine the non-income effects of TANF participation on child
cognitive development as measured by the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test. They
control for child and mother characteristics, welfare connections, family dynamics, and
home environment factors. Their results indicate that welfare receipt is associated
with an 11% of a standard deviation decrease in child cognitive score. They find that
7% of the effect of TANF is through maternal stress while income accounts for 18%.
Herbst (2014) also examines child cognitive ability but studies the impact of a
specific TANF policy, the age-of-youngest-child exemptions. Following PRWORA
there was substantial variation across states in regards to when a mother had to
return to work following the birth of a child, ranging from 0 months to as many
as 24 months. Herbst uses this variation and panel data from the Early Childhood
Longitudinal Study Birth Cohort to estimate the impact of maternal employment on
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early life cognitive ability as measured by the Bayley Short Form-Research test. His
result indicates that each month of maternal work corresponds to a 0.08 standard
deviation reduction in cognitive score.
With my sample of young adults, I am able to test the impact of welfare reform on
a variety of outcomes relating to educational attainment and family structure. The
education outcomes are a natural extension of the test scores examined in childhood
and the work so far in the welfare reform literature, suggesting potential improve-
ments to childhood human capital. Educational attainment represents one of the
consistently bright spots for children after welfare reform. Offner (2005) uses March
CPS data and find that high school drop-out rates among teenagers declined 24
percent after welfare reform. While Miller and Zhang (2012) use both the October
schooling supplement of the CPS and administrative Common Core data and find
a 20 percent reduction in high school dropout rates. Dave et al. (2012) examines
difference by gender and use the October CPS to employ a triple difference model
comparing high risk of welfare teenage girls to low risk teenage boys. They find that
welfare reform reduced the odds of a teen girl dropping out by 15 percent. In light of
these results, I expect higher college attendance and completion rates as adults, with
welfare reform potentially having stronger effects for women.
The family structure outcomes are motivated by two of the explicit goals of TANF,
“prevent and reduce the incidence of out of wedlock pregnancies and establish annual
numerical goals for preventing and reducing the incidence of these pregnancies” and
“encourage the formation and maintenance of two parent families.” Early evidence
of the effect of welfare reform on family structure is mixed with studies finding no
robust effects (Fitzgerald and Ribar, 2004; Graefe and Lichter, 2008; Dunifon et al.,
2009; Knab et al., 2009), lower rates of marriage (Bitler et al., 2004), more children
living in married families (Bitler et al., 2006a), and more children in blended families
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(Cherlin and Fomby, 2005). This paper seeks to provide clarity to this literature by
estimating the long-run impacts of welfare reform on family structure for the children
of welfare reform.
2.3 Model
Key to this project is modeling the technology of human capital or skills pro-
duction. My model is similar to the one described by Cunha and Heckman (2007),
whereby skills in the current period are a function of skills and investments made pre-
viously as well as fixed family characteristics. Specifically, for any period, t ∀t ≥ 0,
the production function is written as
θt+1 = f(h, θt, It), (2.1)
where θ represents a vector of skills or attributes, h denotes time-invariant parental
characteristics, and It is investment in human capital in the previous period.
Equation 2.1 can be rewritten in recursive form by substituting for θt, θt−1, ...
repeatedly:
θt+1 = g(h, θ0, I1, ..., It), (2.2)
where θ0 is the individual’s endowment of skills at birth.
For simplicity, suppose that birth/prenatal is period 0, childhood is period 1, and
young adulthood is period 2. In this case, I can rewrite equation (2.2) as:
θ2 = g(h, θ0, I1) (2.3)
In words, skills as a young adult are a function of fixed family characteristics, ones
endowment of skills at birth, and investments made when in childhood. Applying this
framework to welfare reform, the change in welfare policies potentially changes the
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investment decisions of affected mothers. If the child is young enough, these policy
changes could also affect the decision-making of the pregnant mother, thus changing
the child’s birth endowment as well. Adulthood outcomes are then a function of these
changes to childhood endowments and investments.
With some assumptions, equation (2.3) can be estimated with the use of proxies
for each of the production inputs. First, I assume that the production function g is
linear in inputs and is constant across time and individuals. Young adulthood human
capital, θ2, can be proxied by educational attainment and family structure. Let birth
weight and being breastfed be proxies for initial skill endowment, θ0. Early childhood
exposure to welfare reform, explained in detail below, is a proxy for the family in-
vestment decisions in childhood human capital, I1. A model with siblings and family
fixed effects is also estimated to control for time-invariant parental characteristics, h.
With these assumptions, the task is to compare children affected by welfare reform
to similar children who were not. Here I exploit the differential rollout of state welfare
waivers and TANF implementation between the years of 1992 to 1997 to estimate a
triple difference model. I compare the outcomes of adults who were exposed to welfare
reform to those who were not, taking likelihood of welfare participation into account.
The model takes the form:
Yistb = γWisb + δTi + β(Wisb ∗ Ti) + ΓXistb + ηt + ηs + ηb + uistb, (2.4)
where i denotes the individual, t the interview year, s the state of residence, and b the
birth year. Yistb is the outcome of interest, Wisb indicates exposure to welfare reform,
Ti takes a value of one if the child is from a low-educated single mother household,
Xistb is a vector of demographic and state level controls and includes measures of birth
weight and being breastfed, ηt, ηs, and ηb are interview year, state, and birth year fixed
effects, respectively. Lastly, uistb is the error term that is assumed to be uncorrelated
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with the covariates. All reported standard errors are clustered at the state level. As
is common in the literature, low-educated refers to having twelve years of education
or less. Here, mother means biological, step, adoptive mother, or grandmother. The
comparison group for these at-risk children is the children of higher-educated single
mothers and children from two parent families where at least one parent has less than
a college degree. Children from households with two college-educated parents are
omitted from the analysis.
For the main independent variable, Wisb, I follow the approach of Hoynes et al.
(2016) and measure how much of the individual’s life before the age of five they were
exposed to welfare reform. The variable is the share of months between conception and
the age of five that either welfare waivers or TANF were in place in their state. Given
the evidence from Kaestner and Lee (2005) that welfare reform affects a mother’s
prenatal decision it is important to account for welfare reform exposure that occurs
in-utero. The variable takes a value of 0 if the child turned five before any welfare
reform was implemented in their state and a value of 1 if they were conceived after
welfare reform.3 Any in-between value will be some fraction expressed as x/69 where
x is the number of months they were exposed. Major welfare waiver and TANF
implementation dates are taken from Crouse (1999).
This method is different from natural experiments that are episodic, in that they
“turn on” and then later “turn off.” Here, once a state reforms its AFDC program
either through welfare waivers or by implementing TANF, it keeps the reform and does
not revert or “turn off.” This restricts the comparisons that can be made because there
will never an adult that was exposed in early childhood, but not later childhood. As
such, comparisons are about additional welfare reform exposure earlier in childhood,
conditional on having it later in childhood as well.
3I assume a 9 month gestation period between birth and conception
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Interpreting the coefficients from equation (2.4), γ is the own effect of full welfare
reform exposure and δ is the own effect of growing up in a disadvantaged low-educated,
single mother household that is at risk of being affected by welfare reform. The pa-
rameter of interest is then β and represents the impact of full welfare reform exposure,
being exposed from conception to age 5, for someone who’s likely to be affected by
welfare reform. This means that β is an intent-to-treat estimate. Because going from
zero months of exposure to sixty-nine months of exposure can be seen as a drastic
change, I also present treatment estimates at the mean level of exposure. Looking at
the mean level of exposure gives me an average intent-to-treat effect (AITT). This
assumes that all children of single low-educated mothers were affected by welfare
reform. The model also assumes that the effect of one additional month of welfare
reform exposure is constant regardless of age, an assumption I relax in section 2.5.3.
Note that γ then represents the impact of welfare reform exposure on someone who is
not at-risk to take up AFDC/TANF. As such I expect the coefficient to be zero. Iden-
tification of β is given by variation in states’ passage of welfare waivers and TANF,
the birth year of the adults, and their family status when they were children. The
model assumes there is no difference in cognitive and noncognitive trends between
children of low-educated single mothers and high educated single mothers or children
from low-educated two parent families before the implementation of welfare reform.
In the model, the outcomes for both childhood and adulthood are the individual’s
skills. Ideally, measured skills would be the same between the two periods but in
practice this is unfortunately not the case in the data. In childhood, the vector
of human capital skills consists of test scores and behavior scales for cognitive and
noncognitive skills, respectively. For cognitive skills, I use the Woodcock-Johnson
Revised Tests of Achievement (WJ-R) originally developed by Woodcock et al. (1989).
My measure of childhood noncognitive function comes from the Behavioral Problem
Index (BPI). Because measures of cognitive and noncognitive skills are not available in
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adulthood, I examine outcomes that are at least partly determined by their cognitive
and noncognitive skills. This includes educational attainment and changes to family
structure. Education is used because it is a natural extension of the childhood test
scores and family structure because it is an explicit goal of the TANF program.
To try to control for unobserved family characteristics, h in equation (2.2), I also
run a model with family fixed effects, meaning uistb is correlated with the X ′s. Here
the sample only includes individuals that have a sibling in the data as well. That
empirical model can be written as
Ỹistb = γW̃isb + β(W̃isb ∗ Ti) + ΓX̃istb + ηt + ηs + ηb + uistb, (2.5)
where ˜ indicates the family-time-demeaned variable. This model compares indi-
viduals who were exposed to welfare reform to their siblings that were not exposed
while sweeping out time-invariant family characteristics. In this model, identification
comes from pairs of siblings with different amounts of welfare exposure due to being
born at different times.
2.4 Data
Data for this project comes from two supplements of the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID), the Child Development Supplement (CDS) and the Transition
to Adulthood Supplement (TAS). The PSID is longest running longitudinal survey,
starting with 4,802 households in 1968 and still follows all members and descendants
to this day. In 1997, the PSID supplemented its main data collection with additional
information on 3,563 0-12 year-old children and their parents for the CDS. The chil-
dren were drawn at random from participating core families with the condition that
there cannot be more than 2 children from any household. The children were followed
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up twice after the 1997 survey, once in 2002 and again in 2007. Information about
the children was collected from their Primary Care Giver (PCG), most typically their
mother. Once children reached the age of 18 they left the CDS and entered the TAS.
The TAS was first fielded in 2005 with the aim of collecting information on young
adults who had not yet formed their own household, a growing group of individuals
that many surveys miss. The TAS has been fielded every two years since 2005, with
the most recent wave being in 2015, and collects information on schooling, labor
force outcomes, and health. Individuals enter the TAS when they turn 18 and stay
until they are 28 years old, even if they have formed their own household during
that time. The analysis sample includes one observation for each interview year that
the individual satisfies these age restrictions. Adults in the TAS were children when
welfare reform was enacted.
Because of the longitudinal structure of the PSID, I am able to follow these young
adults back to their childhood and measure their welfare reform exposure and in-
vestment in their human capital production. This information comes from the core
family files and the CDS. I assign family status and state of residency to the child
using information from the 1997 wave for computing their welfare exposure and treat-
ment. The TAS sample consists only of children who were interviewed for the CDS.
This means I have data on their childhood human capital levels as well as measures
of human capital investment. All relevant information on measures of cognitive and
noncognitive skill and tables come from the PSID CDS 1997 User Guide by Hofferth
et al. (1997). In section 2.5, I show results from the “first stage” of the model by
examining if welfare had an impact on childhood outcomes, to motivate the effects I
see on adult outcomes.
For cognitive skills, I use the Woodcock-Johnson Revised Tests of Achievement
(WJ-R) originally developed by Woodcock et al. (1989). The WJ-R test contains
nine subtests measuring different aspects of academic achievement and was used in
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the NLSY-Child Study and the Carolina Abecedarian Project as well. The WJ-R
test has been used throughout the psychology literature to measure child achievement
(Nelson et al., 2004; Davis-Kean, 2005; Hughes and Kwok, 2007). For the CDS, the
PSID administered 3 subtests in each of the three waves that cover the reading and
math portions of the test. The three subtests are Letter-Word Identification, Passage
Comprehension, and Applied Problems. The letter-word and applied problems tests
were administered to children over the age of one, and the passage comprehension
test was administered to children ages five and older. A description of each individual
subtest is found in Appendix Table A.1.
My measure of childhood noncognitive function comes from the Behavioral Prob-
lem Index (BPI). The BPI is a 30-item questionnaire administered to the child’s PCG
developed by Peterson and Zill (1986). Each question describes a different problem-
atic behavior and asks the PCG whether the child exhibits the problem behavior
often, sometimes, or never. Behaviors include having sudden changes in mood or
feeling, is fearful or anxious, bullies or is cruel or mean, demands a lot of attention.
Behaviors are also divided into two subscales, a measure of externalizing or aggressive
behavior and a measure of internalizing, withdrawn or sad behavior. The index is
then the total number of affirmative responses among the 30 questions. The BPI
has been used to study children across a variety of disciplines in the US and the
UK (McCormick et al., 1990; McCulloch et al., 2000; Christakis et al., 2004; Bernal
and Keane, 2011). In the CDS, the questions are asked for every child 3 and older.
Appendix Table A.2 lists each of the 30 questions and lists if they are external or
internal behaviors as well as their reliability taken from Hofferth et al. (1997).
Survey weighted descriptive statistics for the CDS sample can be found in Table
2.1. Given the age restrictions on the tests, the sample sizes here fluctuate. For the
WJ-R subtests the standardized score, which is standardized by age, is the outcome
of interest. For BPI, I examine the raw score. The BPI has a maximum score of
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thirty and a minimum score of zero. A higher BPI score means the child exhibits
more problematic behaviors. The average amount of welfare reform exposure is 0.30
which translates to about twenty months. In the sample there are 2,464 observations
of children with no welfare reform exposure, and there are 2,992 observations of
children with a nonzero amount of exposure. For these children with exposure the
average amount is 0.54 which is about three years. Roughly twenty percent of children
are from an at-risk household. Information on state controls comes from University
of Kentucky Center for Poverty Research Welfare Data. The child’s birth weight
and if they were breastfed are included in the models to control for in-utero/birth
characteristics, θ0 from equation (2.2). State controls are used to try to account for
the local macroeconomy. State minimum wage and maximum TANF benefits are
measured in 2007 dollars. State EITC is calculated as a percentage of the federal
rate.
Survey weighted descriptive statistics for the TAS sample are found in Table 2.2.
The descriptive statistics of the TAS sample show a population that is still finishing
school, with almost three-quarters reporting that they have at least attended college
but only 27 percent over the age of twenty with a two or four year college degree.4
For family structure 11 percent of the sample is married and 14 percent have a child
out of wedlock. Eighteen percent of them are from an at-risk household. For these
adults the average amount of exposure is 0.17 which is approximately one year of
childhood was spent in a state that had enacted some kind of welfare reform. There
are 4,003 observations of adults with no welfare reform exposure, and there are 2,353
observations of adults with exposure. For those with exposure the average amount is
0.46 or about thirty-two months.
4Because of the time it takes to complete any college degree is at least two years, all analysis
examining college completion is restricted to the sample of individuals twenty years or older.
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This low rate of exposure is largely an artifact of the way the data is constructed.
Those with the least amount of exposure would be those who were the oldest in the
CDS, the children who had already turned five before welfare reform was enacted.
These children would turn 18 first and thus would be in the TAS before the youngest
children that have the most exposure to welfare reform. These older children are then
in the TAS for up to five waves while the younger children with the most exposure
may only be in the TAS for one or two waves.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Main Results
To help motivate the adult results, I first present results for the childhood sam-
ple. If welfare reform affects the livelihood of the adults, I should expect to find
some effect of welfare reform on their cognitive or noncognitive skills when they are
children. Though as described previously, sometimes these effects can be latent and
not manifest themselves until later years. The results are shown in Tables 2.3 & 2.4.
Table 2.3 shows least squares results from equation (2.4) while Table 2.4 shows results
from the family fixed effects model, equation (2.5).
In these tables the coefficient for welfare treatment corresponds to β, the coef-
ficient for welfare exposure corresponds to γ, and being from an at-risk household
corresponds to δ from equations (2.4) & (2.5). For welfare treatment, the interpre-
tation of the coefficient is the effect of an at-risk child going from no welfare reform
exposure before the age of five to full welfare reform exposure before the age of 5.
These results should be interpreted as the total effect of welfare reform treatment.
The two tables show that at-risk children exposed to welfare reform experienced bet-
ter outcomes compared to the comparison group. The magnitudes are generally larger
in the fixed effect specification, but both specifications show that fully treated chil-
dren improved their reading test scores by a statistically significant and fairly large
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amount, between 23-39 percent of a standard deviation. At the mean level of exposure
of twenty months, this translates to a 6-7 percent of a standard deviation increase in
reading test scores.
The effect of treatment also has a positive but statistically insignificant effect on
the applied problems mathematics test score. Though the coefficient is negative in
both specifications, suggesting an improvement in behavior, I do not see a statisti-
cally significant effect of welfare treatment on my noncognitive measure, the BPI. As
expected, the coefficients for welfare exposure for those at low risk of being affected by
welfare reform are statistically not different from zero as apart from one instance, the
fixed effect model for letter word score, suggesting there is potentially some kind of
cohort effect beyond what is captured by the birth-year fixed effects. The coefficients
for being from an at-risk household matches what one would expect. Children from
disadvantaged families have lower test scores and exhibit more problematic behav-
iors. The results show that the short-run effect of welfare reform treatment suggests
improvement to reading test scores with potential gains to mathematics and behavior
as well. With gains potentially this large for fully exposed children, I should expect
to see improvements in adulthood as well, particularly with regard to educational
attainment.
It is helpful to put the magnitude of these effects in the context of the larger
literature. For the childhood results, my findings of an average effect of a 5-7 percent
of a standard deviation increase in reading scores are in line with the earlier work of
Morris et al. (2009) who found that young children whose family participated in a
state welfare experiment that raised earnings and employment saw an increase in their
achievement tests by 7 percent of a standard deviation. However, these magnitudes
are smaller than what researchers have found examining the Project STAR results.
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As outlined by Schanzenbach (2006), researchers have consistently found that smaller
class sizes increase test scores by 15 percent of a standard deviation, with minority
students getting an even larger boost.
I now turn to the TAS sample to test for the long-run impacts of welfare reform.
Tables 2.5 & 2.6 present the main results for the young adult sample. The results are
in line with the childhood results of higher test scores and fewer problematic behaviors.
Adults who were treated by welfare reform as children show strong improvements in
the likelihood of graduating college, the likelihood they are married, and are less
likely to have a child out of wedlock. For educational attainment, the coefficients for
the family fixed effect model are larger in magnitude than the OLS specification but
have the same pattern of statistical significance. Interestingly, neither specification
finds an effect of welfare reform treatment on the likelihood of attending college,
though both are positive, but both find that full welfare reform treatment increases
the likelihood of graduating college by about 15 to 20 percentage points. At the mean
level of exposure of twelve months, this is an average intent-to-treat effect of 9 to 12
percent increase from the baseline means.
The OLS model also shows that the fully treated adults are 8.1 percentage points
more likely to be married, with the average welfare treatment effect being 12 percent
more likely, but this coefficient is not statistically different from zero when controlling
for fixed family characteristics. Similarly, the fully treated adults are 15 percentage
points less likely to have a child out of wedlock. Those with the mean level of treat-
ment are 2.6 percentage points or 18 percent less likely to have a child out of wedlock,
though this effect is also not statistically different from zero when controlling for fixed
family characteristics. As expected, the coefficients for welfare exposure among low-
risk children are zero with one exception, for the OLS model of marriage. However, it
does not persist once fixed family characteristics are accounted for. The coefficients
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for growing up in a disadvantaged household suggest that young adults have lower
rates of educational attainment, less likely to be married, and more likely to have a
child out of wedlock.
These results show strong improvements for children who grew up affected by
welfare reform. It appears the gains to reading test scores as a child translate to higher
educational attainment later in life. Perhaps because they are more educated, they
also find themselves in more stable family environments. Treated adults show some
evidence of higher rates of marriage and fewer children born out of wedlock, suggesting
that TANF is meeting its goal of more two parent, stable families. However, it should
be noted that these are all relatively young adults whose ultimate family structure
may yet to be determined, but these early results are consistent with program goals.
Here again, it is helpful to put these effect sizes into context. Bastian and Michel-
more (2018) find that teenage exposure to EITC increases the likelihood of completing
college by 4.2 percent while Cohodes et al. (2016) find that Medicaid expansion be-
tween the 1980 and 1990 birth cohorts increased college completion by 6 percent.
While these are both smaller effects than what I find, it should be noted that these
papers both focus on completion of a four year college degree, while I examine both
two year completion and four year completion. For family structure, Bitler et al.
(2004) find that TANF implementation is associated with a 13-21 percent reduction
in marriage rates. My estimate for the second generation of welfare reform suggests
an almost equal but opposite increase in marriage. For fertility, Garfinkel et al. (2003)
and Horvath-Rose et al. (2008) examine specific attributes of welfare reform, state
welfare benefits and family caps respectively, and find reductions in non-marital births
of 4-6 percent. This suggests that my drops in non-marital births may be driven more
by gains to education and increases to marriage.
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The improvements to childhood test scores coincides with improvements to adult
educational attainment. The next question is what could be inducing improvements
to childhood cognitive function? One of the significant changes of welfare reform
is that TANF moved away from cash benefits to more in-kind benefits. Child care
subsidies make up a significant portion of states’ in-kind benefits (Ziliak, 2016b).
Combined with the work requirements, these policies may induce mothers to opt for
formal child care. High quality formal child care has been shown to improve childhood
cognitive and noncognitive function (Morris et al., 2009; Heckman et al., 2013; Elango
et al., 2015). The effect of welfare reform on child care use is shown in Table 2.7.
Here I test if welfare reform led to more child care use overall child care use and
specifically if the care was informal care or formal care. Here informal care is defined as
being watched by a relative or other individual and formal care encompasses daycare,
pre-K, before and after school programs, and extra curricular programs. Parents may
report multiple forms of formal and informal care. Table 2.7 shows that total child
care use increased but only usage of formal child care increased by a statistically
significant amount. At-risk children with the mean level of welfare reform exposure
are 26 percent more likely to be enrolled in formal child care, while only being 4
percent more likely to use informal child care. This shift to formal care helps explain
the increase in childhood reading test scores.
2.5.2 Results By Gender
Given that TANF and its predecessor AFDC primarily benefit single mothers, and
the work of Hartley et al. (2017) on the transmission of welfare use from mothers to
daughters, I also test if the children of welfare reform have different results by gender.
Tables 2.8 & 2.10 show results for boys and girls, respectively. Tables 2.9 & 2.11 show
results for adult men and women, respectively. Here I present the results from the
model without family fixed effects. The sample size is too small otherwise to reliably
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draw any inference, as a family fixed effects model by gender would only compare
brothers to brothers and sisters to sisters. From childhood to adulthood, the effects
of welfare treatment are much stronger for females than males.
Tables 2.8 & 2.9 show the results for males. Here the results are much weaker
compared to full sample results show in Tables 2.3 & 2.5. For the childhood sample,
welfare reform treatment does not have an impact on the reading scores or behavior
of young boys. The coefficients for the reading test scores are still positive, but not at
a statistically significant level. Boys also do not appear to be as affected by growing
up in a disadvantaged household. Given the lack of a measurable effect of welfare
reform on young boys, it is perhaps not surprising that I also find a lack of an impact
of welfare reform treatment when these boys are young men. These results are seen
in Table 2.9.
I find that treated men are not more likely to complete college at a statistically
significant level. However, the men are still more likely to be married at a rate roughly
equal to that for the whole sample, 7.3 percentage points for the fully treated and 1.2
percentage points for those with mean level of exposure. There are no statistically
significant effects of welfare treatment on college attendance, starting their own family
unit, or having a child out of wedlock. Here again, men appear to be less affected by
growing up in a disadvantaged household, though they are statistically significantly
more likely to have a child out of wedlock if they are from a disadvantaged household.
For females however, I find strong effects of welfare reform on childhood test scores
and adult outcomes. These results are shown in Tables 2.10 & 2.11. Girls seem to
be entirely driving the main results from Table 2.3. Girls who were fully treated by
welfare reform score 35-47 percent of a standard deviation higher on their reading
tests. At the mean level of treatment, this is a 10-14 percent of a standard deviation
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improvement. Girls appear to be deeply affected by growing up in a disadvantage
household. Girls from these families score much worse on their reading and math
tests and they exhibit more problematic behaviors.
These gains seen for the girls in childhood carries over into young adulthood.
Young women who were fully treated by welfare reform are 23 percentage points
more likely to graduate college. For the mean level of exposure this is a 13.5 percent
increase from baseline. Women with full treatment are 9.2 percentage points more
likely to be currently married. At the mean level of treatment, this is a 12 percent
increase and a 22 percent reduction, respectively. The disadvantages of growing up in
a family at-risk of being affected by welfare reform continues into adulthood. Those
women from low-educated single mother households are less likely to attend college,
more likely to be a single parent, and are less likely to be married.
It appears that the gains from welfare treatment shown in the OLS model in Table
2.5 are primarily driven by women. While men do see gains to college completion and
are less likely to have a child out of wedlock, the results are much stronger for women.
Interestingly, the effects of welfare reform on child care usage is the same between boys
and girls as seen in Appendix Tables A.3 & A.4. As in the whole sample, both boys
and girls are significantly more likely to use formal child care use. While somewhat
surprising, these results do match some of the larger literature. The results for female
educational attainment are in line with the literature that finds that welfare reform
reduced the rates of female high school dropouts (Offner, 2005; Dave et al., 2012;
Miller and Zhang, 2012; Hartley et al., 2017). Other programs such as the Moving to
Opportunity experiment, which moved young children to nicer neighborhoods, also
found that teenage girls were the largest beneficiary of the improved environment
(Chetty et al., 2016).
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2.5.3 Robustness Checks
I now turn my attention to the possibility of endogenous migration. To this
point there have been no restrictions on the individuals staying in the same state all
throughout childhood. If parents and their children migrated in response to welfare
generosity, then the movement would be endogenous and bias the results of the model.
To address this, I re-estimate equation (2.4), for childhood and adult outcomes, on
individuals who never moved states during childhood. These results are shown in
Tables 2.12 and 2.13.
For the childhood results, Table 2.12, the results are generally similar to the main
results shown in Table 2.3 both in terms of magnitude and percent change. The
exception being that the estimates for the effect of full welfare treatment are stronger
for the reading tests for the sample of non-movers. The effect of welfare treatment
is now positive for the behavior problem index, but still not statistically different
from zero. Given the point estimates, this is likely due to the smaller sample size
and resulting larger standard errors for the estimates. The own effect of welfare
reform exposure persists between specifications as does the effect of being from a
disadvantaged household. This trend holds for the young adult results as well, seen
in Table 2.13. The effect of welfare reform treatment on college completion and
family structure is robust to the sample of non-movers only and nearly identical in
magnitude and percent change. For the family structure outcomes, the results are
still statistically insignificant though they are larger in magnitude. The results of the
fixed effect specification also hold for the sample of nonmovers. These results are seen
in Appendix Tables A.5 & A.6.
One might also be concerned about the effect of changing state policies over these
time periods such as Medicaid expansion or SNAP liberalization that won’t be cap-
tured by state and survey year fixed effects. To control for any state specific time
trends I re-estimate equation (2.4) and include state-year fixed effects. This is done for
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both childhood and adult outcomes and the results are seen in Tables 2.14 and 2.15.
Here again the results are quite similar to the main specifications. This suggests that
my results are not driven by other changing state specific policies. I also re-estimate
the fixed effect specifications including state-year fixed effects. These results are seen
in Appendix Tables A.7 & A.8.
In Appendix Tables A.9 & A.10 I test the sensitivity of my results to the inclusion
of particular control variables. Here I focus on childhood letter word reading test
scores and adult college completion, the two results that are the most robust to alter-
native specifications. For identification purposes, each of the triple difference terms
and the fixed effects are included in each specification. Both Appendix Tables A.9 &
A.10 show that the effect of welfare reform is statistically significant in all variations.
The individual demographic controls shown in column (2) have the largest effect on
the welfare treatment coefficient, as it increases from the no controls specification
in column (1). Adding in controls for the mother’s characteristics also dramatically
attenuates the coefficient for being from an at-risk household.
Lastly, I explore an alternative specification for childhood exposure to welfare re-
form and adult outcomes to examine the effect of the timing of exposure. Though
the literature agrees that early childhood is a crucial time, it is possible that welfare
reform exposure at all ages matters for later life outcomes. In this alternative speci-
fication, I use an event study model that allows me to explore the timing of welfare
reform exposure more thoroughly.
In the event study framework, I allow the effect of welfare reform to vary by
the individual’s age at welfare reform implementation in their state for the sample
of individuals that were raised by a low-educated single mother. For example, If a
person was eight years old when welfare reform was implemented in their state, they
would have an event time of 8. If welfare reform was implemented two years before
they were born, they would have an event time of −2. I then replace the exposure
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measure in the difference in difference model of equation (??) with a series of dummy
variables based on the individuals age at welfare reform from two years prior to birth




γaDisb + ΓXistb + ηt + ηs + ηb + uistb, (2.6)
where Disb = 1 if their age at welfare reform implementation is equal to a. I present
the results for college completion for the sample of individuals that were raised by
low-educated single mothers in Figure 2.2 and as a placebo test for the advantaged
sample of adults who were not raised by a low-educated single mother household in
Figure 2.3.
Here I focus on the college completion outcome as it is the long-run outcome
that is consistently significant across specifications. It is important to note that this
graph is the opposite of the typical event study graph. Here, exposure decreases as
one moves to the right of the graph. A person with an event time of −1 is exposed
from in-utero through all of childhood, while a person with event time of 8 is only
exposed from age 8 onwards. The results for the at-risk sample match the literature
which suggests that in-utero and very early childhood exposure will have the largest
impact on adult outcomes. The figure shows those exposed pre-birth to the age of
one have the largest gains when it comes to college completion as an adult. The
effect of welfare reform exposure steadily decreases as the child’s age at first exposure
increases, though the effects of exposure are still positive through age nine. The effect
is less precisely measured at young ages though, reflecting the relatively low amount
of welfare exposure in the adult sample as outlined before. The relative flatness of
the line in negative time to birth also helps rule out the possibility of any pre-trends
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that could be influencing my results. The results in Figure 2.3 are also encouraging
for my estimation approach, as welfare reform exposure for those not at-risk of being
affected by welfare reform has no effect on college completion across all ages.
2.6 Conclusion
Childhood circumstance can have wide reaching implications for adulthood. In the
economics literature everything from childhood health and income to neighborhood
to school has been shown to have effects later in life. This paper is part of a growing
section of literature to seeks to answer what are the long-run effects of childhood
exposure to the social safety net. As welfare reform passed its twenty year anniversary,
this is one of the first tests for the long-run effects of the TANF program. These results
are crucial to our understanding of the total impact of the TANF program, and its
implications for policy changes to other programs in the future.
Using data from the PSID, I model the human capital production technology as
a function of childhood investment. I estimate the model empirically using a triple
difference framework that can accommodate family fixed effects. I first contribute to
the existing literature on the short-run effects of welfare reform by showing that at-
risk children who were exposed to welfare reform score higher on reading achievement
tests. Turning to the adult sample, I find that these same children are more likely
to complete college, more likely to be married, and are less likely to have a child
out of wedlock. The latter two results suggesting that PRWORA was successful in
its goal of promoting two-parent families. Increased formal child care use is a likely
mechanism for these improvements.
Women seem to benefit more from this treatment than men. As girls they score
much higher on their cognitive reading tests. For women affected by welfare reform,
they are much more likely to complete college, be married, and not be a single mother.
For the whole sample, the effect of welfare treatment on higher reading scores and
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college completion is robust to the addition of family fixed effects, the sample of non-
movers, and the inclusion of state-time fixed effects. Using an event study model I
find that first exposure has the largest impact when the individual is in-utero through
the age of one.
Finally, putting these results into the context of the larger literature on welfare
reform, it is helpful to recall the words of Blank (2009). In her survey chapter, she
concludes by saying, “It is perhaps surprising that these very large changes in welfare
use, work, and earnings have had at best small effects on other domains of family life
among single-mother families . . . It is possible that these other domains will show
effects only over time, with longer-term cumulative effects on health, child outcomes,
or fertility that are simply not yet visible in the data.” The results presented here
reflect her belief that the wider effects from welfare reform are not found in the
single-mothers themselves but in the lives of their grown children.
The changes to household environment brought on by welfare reform were perhaps
felt the strongest by the children of the household during their formative years than
by the parents themselves. My work presented here, along with Hartley et al. (2017),
suggests this to be the case. Both papers find noticeable effects of welfare reform
on adult outcomes for those who were children at the time of welfare waivers and
PRWORA. These results are among the first in an emerging literature on the long-
run effect of welfare reform. However, there is still more work to be done. As the
sample ages we will be able to examine long-run effects of welfare reform on outcomes
such as health, earnings, and family structure.
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Tables and Figures
Figure 2.1: Welfare Reform Implementation Year, By State
Figure 2.2: Event Study Estimates of the Impact of Welfare Reform on College
Completion - At-Risk Sample
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Figure 2.3: Event Study Estimates of the Impact of Welfare Reform on College
Completion - Advantaged Sample Placebo Test
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics - Child Development Supplement
Mean SD Observations
Welfare Exposure 0.30 0.36 5456
Raised by Low-Edu Single Mom 0.17 0.38 5456
Cognitive Outcomes
Letter Word Score 103.75 18.19 4760
Applied Problems Score 104.05 16.51 4741
Passage Comprehension Score 102.25 16.33 4173
Noncognitive Outcome
Behavior Problem Index 8.49 6.31 5341
Demographics
Child Age 11.49 4.04 5456
Male 0.51 0.50 5456
White 0.61 0.49 5456
Black 0.18 0.38 5456
Number of Siblings 1.46 1.14 5456
Birthweight (ounces) 119.01 21.74 5456
Was Breastfed 0.54 0.50 5456
Mother Age 38.90 7.82 5456
Mother Less Than HS Edu. 0.22 0.41 5456
Mother HS Degree 0.36 0.48 5456
Mother Some College Edu. 0.33 0.47 5456
Mother College Degree 0.07 0.26 5456
Mother Postgraduate 0.03 0.17 5456
Raised By Grandparents 0.03 0.16 5456
Urban Residency 0.63 0.48 5456
State Controls
State Unemployment Rate 5.29 1.05 5456
State Minimum Wage 6.33 0.82 5456
State EITC Rate 0.04 0.08 5456
Maximum TANF Benefit 2-Person 378.97 145.09 5456
Maximum TANF Benefit 3-Person 471.29 181.08 5456
Maximum TANF Benefit 4-Person 552.18 206.44 5456
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics - Transition to Adulthood Supplement
Mean SD Observations
Welfare Exposure 0.17 0.29 6356
Raised By Low-Edu Single Mom 0.18 0.38 6356
Outcomes
Some College 0.71 0.45 6278
College Degree 0.27 0.44 4397
Currently Married 0.11 0.31 6356
Single Parent 0.14 0.35 6354
Demographics
White 0.70 0.46 6356
Black 0.20 0.40 6356
Male 0.50 0.50 6356
Age 21.6 2.73 6356
Number of Siblings 1.61 1.12 6356
Childhood Characteristics
Birth Weight (ounces) 119.3 22.20 6356
Was Breastfed 0.54 0.50 6356
Mother Less Than HS Edu. 0.23 0.42 6356
Mother HS Degree 0.35 0.48 6356
Mother Some College Edu. 0.32 0.47 6356
Mother College Degree 0.06 0.25 6356
Mother Postgraduate 0.03 0.17 6356
Raised By Grandparents 0.03 0.17 6356
State Controls
State Minimum Wage 7.88 0.78 6356
State Unemployment Rate 7.12 2.24 6356
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Table 2.3: Childhood Human Capital
Letter Word Passage Comp. Applied Problems BPI
Welfare Treatment (β) 4.305*** 3.040** 0.574 -0.068
(1.122) (1.390) (1.250) (0.673)
Welfare Exposure (γ) -1.368 -2.233 -2.155 0.396
(1.991) (2.086) (1.839) (0.644)
At-Risk (δ) -3.732*** -2.965*** -0.124 1.249***
(0.695) (0.863) (0.818) (0.305)
Outcome SD 18.14 16.48 16.47 6.31
Percent Change 23.74 18.44 3.49 -1.07
Treatment at Mean Wisb 1.280 0.904 0.171 -0.020
Perc. Change at Mean 7.06 5.48 1.04 -0.32
Obs. 4,884 4,267 4,865 5,503
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level, * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Con-
trols include child gender, child race, number of siblings, child age, mother’s age, mother
education, birth weight, if breastfed, if raised by grandparent, urban residency, state unem-
ployment rate, state minimum wage, state EITC, maximum TANF benefit for 2,3,4 person
families. State, interview year, and birth-year fixed effects included.
Table 2.4: Childhood Human Capital Family Fixed Effects
Letter Word Passage Comp. Applied Problems BPI
Welfare Treatment (β) 7.135* 3.281 1.952 -1.443
(3.661) (2.804) (2.262) (1.073)
Welfare Exposure (γ) -6.188** -1.160 -4.348 0.503
(2.479) (4.280) (3.917) (0.996)
Outcome SD 18.11 16.78 16.12 6.37
Percent Change 39.40 19.56 12.11 -22.64
Treatment at Mean Wisb 2.082 0.957 0.570 -0.421
Perc. Change at Mean 11.50 5.71 3.53 -6.60
Obs. 3,063 2,705 3,050 3,414
Sibling Pairs 786 777 786 813
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level, * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Controls include child gender, child race, number of siblings, child age, mother’s age, birth
weight, if breastfed, urban residency, state unemployment rate, state minimum wage, state
EITC, maximum TANF benefit for 2,3,4 person families. State, interview year, and birth-
year fixed effects included.
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Table 2.5: Adulthood Human Capital
Attend College College Degree Married Single Parent
Welfare Treatment (β) 0.022 0.146*** 0.081*** -0.156**
(0.074) (0.036) (0.021) (0.062)
Welfare Exposure (γ) -0.005 0.040 -0.071** -0.039
(0.064) (0.042) (0.035) (0.039)
At-Risk (δ) -0.082** -0.039* -0.051*** 0.102***
(0.036) (0.023) (0.016) (0.025)
Sample Mean 0.71 0.27 0.11 0.14
Percent Change 3.07 54.76 73.39 -100.00
Treatment at Mean Wisb 0.004 0.024 0.014 -0.026
Perc. Change at Mean 0.51 9.12 12.22 -18.38
Obs. 6,278 4,397 6,356 6,354
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level, * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Controls include gender, race, number of siblings, age, birth weight, if breastfed, mother’s
education, if raised by grandparent, state unemployment rate, state minimum wage. State,
interview year, and birth-year fixed effects included.
Table 2.6: Adulthood Human Capital Family Fixed Effects
Attend College College Degree Married Single Parent
Welfare Treatment (β) 0.078 0.199** 0.044 -0.052
(0.126) (0.088) (0.050) (0.092)
Welfare Exposure (γ) -0.085 -0.202** -0.081 -0.051
(0.095) (0.083) (0.056) (0.109)
Sample Mean 0.73 0.28 0.10 0.14
Percent Change 10.72 70.36 43.04 -36.83
Treatment at Mean Wisb 0.014 0.035 0.008 -0.009
Perc. Change at Mean 1.87 12.25 7.49 -6.41
Obs. 3,878 2,689 3,921 3,919
Sibling Pairs 733 680 734 734
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level, * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Controls include gender, race, age, birth weight, if breastfed, state unemployment rate,
state minimum wage. State, interview year, and birth-year fixed effects included.
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Table 2.7: Child Care Use
Childcare Use Informal Care Formal Care
Welfare Treatment (β) 0.092 0.021 0.063**
(0.061) (0.053) (0.025)
Welfare Exposure (γ) -0.014 -0.021 0.006
(0.026) (0.028) (0.018)
At-Risk (δ) 0.011 0.034** -0.019*
(0.016) (0.013) (0.011)
Outcome Mean 0.21 0.15 0.07
Percent Change 44.21 13.60 88.76
Treatment at Mean Wisb 0.027 0.006 0.019
Perc. Change at Mean 13.15 4.04 26.39
Obs. 6,209 6,209 6,209
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level, * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, ***
p <0.01. Controls include child gender, child race, number of siblings, child
age, mother’s age, mother education, birth weight, if breastfed, if raised
by grandparent, urban residency, state unemployment rate, state minimum
wage, state EITC, maximum TANF benefit for 2,3,4 person families. State,
interview year, and birth-year fixed effects included.
Table 2.8: Childhood Human Capital - Boys
Letter Word Passage Comp. Applied Problems BPI
Welfare Treatment (β) 0.920 1.007 -1.265 1.079
(1.989) (2.207) (2.072) (1.014)
Welfare Exposure (γ) 0.775 -0.439 -3.725* -0.459
(2.200) (2.930) (2.040) (0.892)
At-Risk (δ) -1.516 -1.551 0.921 1.086**
(1.208) (1.236) (1.148) (0.500)
Outcome SD 18.76 17.01 17.40 6.41
Percent Change 4.90 5.92 -7.27 16.83
Treatment at Mean Wisb 0.271 0.296 -0.372 0.317
Perc. Change at Mean 1.44 1.74 -2.14 4.95
Obs. 2,459 2,126 2,453 2,788
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level, * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Controls include child race, number of siblings, child age, mother’s age, mother education,
birth weight, if breastfed, if raised by grandparent, urban residency, state unemployment
rate, state minimum wage, state EITC, maximum TANF benefit for 2,3,4 person families.
State, interview year, and birth-year fixed effects included.
41
Table 2.9: Adulthood Human Capital - Men
Attend College College Degree Married Single Parent
Welfare Treatment (β) -0.089 0.051 0.073** -0.066
(0.104) (0.064) (0.029) (0.065)
Welfare Exposure (γ) 0.025 0.046 -0.042 -0.021
(0.098) (0.063) (0.037) (0.057)
At-Risk (δ) -0.042 -0.005 -0.025 0.067**
(0.048) (0.032) (0.016) (0.029)
Sample Mean 0.67 0.23 0.09 0.10
Percent Change -13.41 22.13 84.47 -69.24
Treatment at Mean Wisb -0.015 0.008 0.012 -0.011
Perc. Change at Mean -2.19 3.62 13.80 -11.31
Obs. 2,961 2,055 2,998 2,996
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level, * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Controls include race, number of siblings, age, birth weight, if breastfed, mother’s edu-
cation, if raised by grandparent, state unemployment rate, state minimum wage. State,
interview year, and birth-year fixed effects included.
Table 2.10: Childhood Human Capital - Girls
Letter Word Passage Comp. Applied Problems BPI
Welfare Treatment (β) 8.280*** 5.546*** 2.523 -1.383
(1.733) (1.971) (1.988) (0.981)
Welfare Exposure (γ) -2.159 -2.854 0.123 2.123**
(2.958) (2.775) (2.580) (0.884)
At-Risk (δ) -6.404*** -4.892*** -1.569* 1.526***
(1.070) (1.021) (0.914) (0.474)
Outcome SD 17.38 15.90 15.39 6.19
Percent Change 47.64 34.89 16.39 -22.35
Treatment at Mean Wisb 2.489 1.667 0.759 -0.416
Perc. Change at Mean 14.32 10.49 4.93 -6.72
Obs. 2,425 2,141 2,412 2,715
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level, * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Controls include child race, number of siblings, child age, mother’s age, mother education,
birth weight, if breastfed, if raised by grandparent, urban residency, state unemployment
rate, state minimum wage, state EITC, maximum TANF benefit for 2,3,4 person families.
State, interview year, and birth-year fixed effects included.
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Table 2.11: Adulthood Human Capital - Women
Attend College College Degree Married Single Parent
Welfare Treatment (β) 0.126 0.230*** 0.092** -0.230***
(0.099) (0.056) (0.034) (0.085)
Welfare Exposure (γ) -0.052 0.034 -0.099* -0.072
(0.083) (0.076) (0.051) (0.054)
At-Risk (δ) -0.110** -0.067** -0.067** 0.124***
(0.048) (0.029) (0.026) (0.040)
Sample Mean 0.75 0.30 0.14 0.19
Percent Change 16.77 76.13 67.61 -100.00
Treatment at Mean Wisb 0.022 0.041 0.016 -0.041
Perc. Change at Mean 2.97 13.48 11.97 -21.88
Obs. 3,317 2,342 3,358 3,358
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level, * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Controls include race, number of siblings, age, birth weight, if breastfed, mother’s edu-
cation, if raised by grandparent, state unemployment rate, state minimum wage. State,
interview year, and birth-year fixed effects included.
Table 2.12: Childhood Human Capital - Nonmovers
Letter Word Passage Comp. Applied Problems BPI
Welfare Treatment (β) 4.651*** 3.349** 0.327 0.027
(1.507) (1.610) (1.277) (0.753)
Welfare Exposure (γ) 0.388 -0.017 -2.556 0.134
(2.083) (2.080) (2.099) (0.792)
At-Risk (δ) -3.512*** -2.938*** 0.100 1.436***
(0.918) (0.928) (1.025) (0.338)
Outcome SD 18.31 16.73 16.48 6.30
Percent Change 25.40 20.02 1.98 0.43
Treatment at Mean Wisb 1.409 1.014 0.099 0.008
Perc. Change at Mean 7.69 6.06 0.60 0.13
Obs. 4,125 3,652 4,110 4,539
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level, * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Con-
trols include child gender, child race, number of siblings, child age, mother’s age, mother
education, birth weight, if breastfed, if raised by grandparent, urban residency, state unem-
ployment rate, state minimum wage, state EITC, maximum TANF benefit for 2,3,4 person
families. State, interview year, and birth-year fixed effects included.
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Table 2.13: Adulthood Human Capital - Nonmovers
Attend College College Degree Married Single Parent
Welfare Treatment (β) -0.005 0.138*** 0.073*** -0.152**
(0.081) (0.042) (0.020) (0.074)
Welfare Exposure (γ) 0.009 0.087 -0.068* -0.054
(0.075) (0.053) (0.038) (0.042)
At-Risk (δ) -0.081* -0.032 -0.053*** 0.106***
(0.041) (0.023) (0.017) (0.032)
Sample Mean 0.72 0.27 0.11 0.14
Percent Change -0.76 50.44 66.57 -100.00
Treatment at Mean Wisb -0.001 0.024 0.013 -0.026
Perc. Change at Mean -0.13 8.78 11.59 -18.58
Obs. 5,278 3,682 5,344 5,342
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level, * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Controls include gender, race, number of siblings, age, birth weight, if breastfed, mother’s
education, if raised by grandparent, state unemployment rate, state minimum wage. State,
interview year, and birth-year fixed effects included.
Table 2.14: Childhood Human Capital - Time Trends
Letter Word Passage Comp. Applied Problems BPI
Welfare Treatment (β) 4.493*** 3.152** 0.768 -0.016
(1.170) (1.418) (1.285) (0.676)
Welfare Exposure (γ) -1.857 -2.158 -2.263 0.311
(2.106) (2.401) (1.897) (0.706)
At-Risk (δ) -3.754*** -2.931*** -0.140 1.204***
(0.694) (0.869) (0.833) (0.304)
Outcome SD 18.14 16.48 16.47 6.31
Percent Change 24.77 19.12 4.66 -0.26
Treatment at Mean Wisb 1.336 0.937 0.228 -0.005
Perc. Change at Mean 7.37 5.68 1.39 -0.08
Obs. 4,884 4,267 4,865 5,503
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level, * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Con-
trols include child gender, child race, number of siblings, child age, mother’s age, mother
education, birth weight, if breastfed, if raised by grandparent, urban residency, state unem-
ployment rate, state minimum wage, state EITC, maximum TANF benefit for 2,3,4 person
families. State, interview year, and birth-year fixed effects included.
44
Table 2.15: Adulthood Human Capital - Time Trends
Attend College College Degree Married Single Parent
Welfare Treatment (β) 0.015 0.141*** 0.084*** -0.157**
(0.076) (0.042) (0.020) (0.063)
Welfare Exposure (γ) -0.008 0.016 -0.083** -0.033
(0.060) (0.056) (0.039) (0.040)
At-Risk (δ) -0.084** -0.038 -0.050*** 0.101***
(0.036) (0.024) (0.016) (0.025)
Sample Mean 0.71 0.27 0.11 0.14
Percent Change 2.08 53.15 76.05 -100.00
Treatment at Mean Wisb 0.003 0.024 0.015 -0.027
Perc. Change at Mean 0.36 9.16 13.10 -19.18
Obs. 6,278 4,397 6,356 6,354
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level, * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Controls include gender, race, number of siblings, age, birth weight, if breastfed, mother’s
education, if raised by grandparent, state unemployment rate, state minimum wage. State,
interview year, and birth-year fixed effects included.
45
Chapter 3: Welfare Reform and Children’s Health
3.1 Introduction
Childhood well-being is a multifaceted measure of interrelated individual, family,
and community level factors. These factors are important not only for the immediate
happiness and livelihood of a child, but also because of the long-reaching impacts
childhood circumstance can have on outcomes throughout the course of the child’s
life. Childhood test scores, family socioeconomic standing, and even neighborhood
quality have been found to predict later life outcomes. Of particular importance
among these early factors is childhood health. Health at all stages of a child’s life,
from in-utero to infant to adolescent, has been shown to have a meaningful impact
later on; not just for future health but also education and labor market outcomes as
well.
As such, government programs that target the health of children either explicitly
such as Medicaid, the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP), and the Supple-
mental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) or more implicitly such as the Earned
Income Tax Credit (EITC) are of particular importance due to their long reaching
influence on well-being. One program that explicitly targets children and has been
understudied with respect to childhood health is the Temporary Assistance to Needy
Families (TANF) program that replaced the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) program in the mid 1990’s, a period commonly referred to as welfare reform.
Like its predecessor, TANF provides in-kind and financial assistance to low in-
come families with children, typically a single mother household. However, under
TANF, individuals now face work requirements, time limits on assistance, stringent
sanctions for noncompliance, and family caps for benefits among other conditions.
Policy makers sought to decrease welfare dependency by moving recipients towards
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employment by changing the incentives AFDC recipients faced. This process was
started in the early 1990’s as states were given waivers to change their AFDC pro-
grams and culminated with the passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) in 1996. PRWORA codified many of
the state changes into the federal law that created the TANF program.
Welfare reform can affect the health of children primarily through the new work
requirements that the mothers faced. As the mothers are moved to work, there may
be a decline in Medicaid coverage for the family, even if the children remain eligi-
ble. However, this loss of public coverage could be offset by gains in private coverage
through their employer (Ham et al., 2009). Additionally, the family’s economic re-
sources could change as a result of employment. While earnings would increase after
the program changes, this could be offset by a loss of transfer income. Much of the
literature finds the total impact of welfare reform on income to be heterogeneous
(Bitler et al., 2006b; Bollinger et al., 2009).
The relationship between welfare reform and the health of children is a relatively
understudied area, due in part to the lack of datasets that ask child focused health
questions. The literature so far has found adverse effects of welfare reform during
in-utero or infant stages with lower rates of prenatal care (Kaestner and Lee, 2005)
and lower rates of breastfeeding (Haider et al., 2003). Beyond these early stages of
childhood there is some evidence of lower rates of health insurance coverage among
children (Cawley et al., 2006) and lower rated health for the children of non-citizens
(Kalil and Ziol-Guest, 2009). The health of mothers is a more explored area and has
generally found a net decrease in health insurance coverage but no change to health
status (Kaestner and Kaushal, 2003; Bitler et al., 2005; Cawley et al., 2006; Kaestner
and Tarlov, 2006).
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To provide further insight into this relationship, I use the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID) Child Development Supplement (CDS) to estimate the impact of
welfare reform on the insurance coverage, healthcare utilization, and health status
of affected children. The CDS is a special supplement of the PSID that was started
in 1997 and interviewed children aged between 0-12 and their primary care giver.
Children are interviewed every five years or until they turn eighteen. The CDS
collects extensive information on the well-being of children that can be combined
with the core family and individual files to create a comprehensive view of the health
of the child.
This paper is the first the study the relationship between welfare reform and
healthcare utilization of children. It also makes important contributions to the lit-
erature on welfare reform and health insurance coverage of children by providing
estimates on overall and composition of coverage. This paper is also the first to ex-
amine the effect of welfare reform on objective and subjective health conditions for a
representative sample of children. I exploit the variation in the timing of welfare re-
form by state and the likelihood of TANF participation to estimate a triple difference
model. Given the literature on health discrepancies among minorities, I also provide
results by children’s race. I find consistent evidence that welfare reform reduced the
likelihood that a child had an annual checkup by 3-5%. This decline in utilization
does not seem to be driven by changes in the insurance coverage of the child. How-
ever, the rate of diagnosed cases of asthma also falls by 17% and treated children
have 3 more healthy, full function days a year. The results for the whole sample mask
important differences by race, with white children reporting drops in their healthcare
utilization and black children reporting drops in diagnosed cases of asthma.
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3.2 Background
3.2.1 The Importance of Childhood Health
Childhood is a particularly important aspect of childhood well-being because of
its immediate importance and its lasting impact on a variety of outcomes beyond
future health status. The lasting impacts of health start at the earliest stages of
childhood. In their review of the literature, Almond and Currie (2011) highlight
that in-utero and infant health, such as born with a low birth weight (born weighing
less than 2500 grams), are strong predictors of future well-being. Individuals born
with low birth weight were more likely to have less schooling, lower earnings, and
in some cases more chronic conditions in their adult life. Infant health investments
such as breastfeeding also impact a child’s well-being by reducing the likelihood of
respiratory tract infections, asthma, obesity, and diabetes as a child and an adult
(American Academy of Pediatrics, 2012).
While much has been written on the causes and consequences of in-utero and
infant health, health status during childhood has received relatively less attention
in the literature. However, the existing research shows that these conditions still
have meaningful impact on future life outcomes. This relationship holds even after
controlling for a variety of confounding factors such as income and education as shown
by Case et al. (2005). Looking at a cohort of British adults born in 1958, Case et al.
analyze the impact of having chronic health conditions as a child on outcomes from
ages 16-42.1 The authors find that having poor health as a young child leads to less
educational attainment at 16; worse self-reported health at ages 23, 33, & 42; and
that men are less likely to be employed at ages 33 and 42.
1For their study, Case et al. include physical impairments, mental and emotional conditions,
and other ‘systems’ conditions as chronic conditions.
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A similar result is shown by Currie et al. (2010). Currie et al. study 50,000 children
born in Manitoba, Canada between 1979 and 1987, and compare the children to their
siblings. Focusing on the health status of the children from age 3 and under, the
authors find that having major health conditions is an important indicator of young
adult physical health, similar to Case et al. However, Currie et al. also find that
early mental health problems such as diagnosed ADHD or conduct behaviors lead to
higher rates of being on social assistance and lower literacy scores as a young adult.
Looking at data from the United States, Smith (2009) uses a sample of siblings from
the PSID to study the effect of self reported health at 16 on adult socioeconomic
outcomes. He finds that being in excellent or very good health at age 16 is associated
with higher household income and wealth, though he does not find a robust effect of
health on education.
Given the illustrated importance of childhood health, government programs that
either explicitly or implicitly target childhood health are of particular policy interest.
There have been a number of recent studies that have looked at the short and long-
run impact of programs such as Medicaid, SNAP, and the EITC. Hoynes et al. (2015)
use the variation from federal reforms to the EITC to examine the effect of after-
tax income on incidences of low birth weight. Using the Vital Statics Natality Data
and the Current Population Survey, the authors find that a $1,000 increase in EITC
receipt leads to a 3 percent decline in a newborn child having a low birth weight.
They attribute the gain to more prenatal care and fewer negative health behaviors
such as smoking among mothers. A similar result is found by Strully et al. (2010)
who examine changes in state EITC programs.
Brown et al. (2017) study expansions to Medicaid and the State Children’s Health
Insurance Program in the 1980’s and 90’s and find that children affected by the expan-
sions paid more in taxes and collected less in EITC by the age of 28. This suggests
that the increased medical coverage among vulnerable children from Medicaid im-
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proved child health and raised their productivity as adults. Hoynes et al. (2016)
examine the county-by-county rollout of the food stamp program in the 1960’s to
test if having access to food stamps as a young child improves adult outcomes. The
authors find that when these children are adults they have better reported health
and an increase in the economic self-sufficiency of women. One mechanism for the
improvements in adult outcomes is better nutrition in early childhood and in-utero.
3.2.2 Welfare Reform and Its Implications for Health
Another program that targets the well-being of children is the TANF program.
TANF was implemented in 1996 with the passage of PRWORA, and replaced the
AFDC welfare program. AFDC was a federal entitlement program that provided
financial assistance to low income families with children, typically a low-educated
single mother household. In the years prior to PRWORA, welfare caseloads had
swelled under AFDC and starting in 1992 states started seeking and receiving waivers
to experiment with their state welfare program to deal with the rising caseloads.2
PRWORA codified many of these changes into federal law. PRWORA sought to
decrease welfare dependency by moving recipients towards employment by changing
the incentives AFDC recipients faced. Under TANF, there was a transition to more
in-kind versus cash benefits. Additionally, individuals now face work requirements,
time limits on assistance, and family caps for benefits among other conditions.
The year that a state first implemented some type of welfare reform, either a
welfare waiver or TANF, is shown in Figure 3.1. Implementation dates are taken
from Crouse (1999). Thirty states implemented a major welfare waiver before TANF.
Nineteen of those thirty implemented a waiver in the years before TANF was passed,
2Politically, rising caseloads appeared to be the motivator for welfare reform, with Bill Clinton
campaigning in 1992 to “end welfare as we know it.” However, Ziliak et al. (2000) show that states
with high caseloads were not more likely to request federal waivers.
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1992-1995, with the remaining states implementing either a waiver or TANF in either
1996 or 1997. Though not shown on the map, Hawaii and Alaska implemented welfare
reform in 1997 as well. The last state to implement any kind of reform was New York
in November, 1997. Figure 3.1 also shows the geographic variation in implementation
dates with no region of states all implementing reform at the same time.
While much has been written on welfare reform over the twenty years that have
passed since TANF became law, we still know little about the effects of welfare reform
on child health.3 There are two main channels for welfare reform to affect childhood
health and both stem from the work requirements mothers faced under TANF. First,
as mothers were moved to work their insurance coverage may change as they lose
public coverage but possibly gain private. Second, as mothers enter the labor force,
income may change as earnings rise but government benefits fall.
As welfare reform moved mothers to work, they could lose their insurance coverage.
Health insurance is an important component of the health production function. Prior
to welfare reform, families receiving AFDC were automatically eligible for health
insurance through Medicaid. PRWORA eliminated this automatic eligibility, though
families who met the 1996 AFDC eligibility standard remained eligible in an effort
to end “welfare-lock.” This severing raised administrative barriers for those who
remained eligible even after gaining employment. As mothers are moved to work,
they may gain private insurance coverage to the extent that former or current welfare
recipients are able to find jobs offering health insurance benefits. The literature
shows a net decrease in health insurance coverage for mothers, suggesting that the
administrative barriers were too great or mothers were unable to find employment
that offered health benefits.
3See Blank (2002) & Ziliak (2016b) for excellent reviews on the broader welfare reform literature.
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This result is shown across multiple data sources. Bitler et al. (2005) use the
Behaviorial Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) from 1990-2000, Kaestner and
Kaushal (2003) use the Current Population Survey (CPS) from 1993-2000, and Caw-
ley et al. (2006) use the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) from
1992-1999. All three papers employ a difference-in-difference approach and find that
the gains in private insurance do not offset the loss of public coverage. DeLeire et al.
(2006) also use the CPS from 1989-2001 and find that welfare reform is associated
with an increase in private insurance coverage, though they find no substantial de-
cline in public coverage rates. Following these studies is work by Ham et al. (2009)
who also use the SIPP but from 1990-2001 to test the validity of the difference-in-
difference approaches used by the previous authors. Their work rejects the parallel
trend assumption, meaning married mothers and single women without children are
not valid comparison groups for single women with children. Despite this, after they
run individual regressions for each group they find a very similar result that Med-
icaid coverage fell more than the gain in private insurance and that this effect is
concentrated among minority women.
Despite this consistent finding of lower net coverage for mothers, it is possible that
children were sheltered from the change. In 1997, Congress created the Children’s
Health Insurance Program (CHIP) which provided incentives and funding to states
to expand healthcare coverage and usage among low-income children. However, the
same administrative barriers apply here as well. As Currie (2004) notes, take up is
enhanced by automatic or default enrollment. Evidence so far suggests that chil-
dren also saw a net decrease in insurance coverage. In the same study, Cawley et al.
(2006) find that post-welfare reform eligible children were 3% less likely to have in-
surance though this is a smaller decline than the 8% the authors find for mothers.
The economics literature on insurance and health care utilization from random ex-
periments shows that health care utilization rises with insurance and health outcomes
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potentially improve (Manning et al., 1987; Finkelstein et al., 2012; Aron-Dine et al.,
2013). Recent work shows that childhood health insurance coverage also mediates
the intergenerational transmission of health status (Halliday et al., 2019).
Second, welfare reform could positively or negatively affect the economic resources
available to the family. The economics literature has demonstrated a positive relation-
ship between income and health (Smith, 1999; Case et al., 2002, 2008). After welfare
reform, the hope was that the rule changes made work “pay” in that the gains in
earnings would more than offset the losses in transfer income. evidence on this point
is somewhat mixed. Early work by Schoeni and Blank (2000) and Grogger (2003)
find modest, positive effects of welfare reform on earnings, income, and poverty rates.
However, the proceeding work tried to account for the heterogeneity in welfare reform
and found varying effects. Work by Bitler et al. (2006b) and Bollinger et al. (2009)
shows that PRWORA lowered the income of less skilled mothers in the bottom half
of the income distribution and raised income among more skilled mothers.
Though welfare reform has clear mechanisms to affect health status, the literature
to date has largely found no effect of welfare reform on health outcomes. Using the
BRFSS, both Bitler et al. (2005) and Kaestner and Tarlov (2006) find no change in the
self reported health status of mothers under TANF. This is despite the net decrease in
insurance coverage both papers find, though Bitler and coauthors do find a decrease
in some measures of healthcare utilization for mothers. Focusing on children’s health,
other work on welfare reform and has also looked at changes in health inputs such
as healthcare utilization. Kaestner and Lee (2005) use the National Natality Files
from 1992-2000 and show that post welfare reform mothers utilized less prenatal care.
The effect is stronger for mothers who participate in WIC. Using a propriety survey,
Haider et al. (2003) found that under TANF, there are fewer mothers who report
breastfeeding their new children. Our only evidence for changes in children’s health
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outcomes comes from Kalil and Ziol-Guest (2009) who use the 1993, 1996, and 2001
panels of the SIPP and find that children of low income non-citizens had lower parent
rated health than children of low income citizens after PRWORA.
This paper seeks to provide clarity and new insight to the existing literature.
Work so far in this area has been limited to either in-utero or infant health production
inputs or subjective health measures for particular demographic groups. This study
comprehensively examines multiple facets of childhood health from their insurance




The empirical task of this study is to compare children affected by welfare reform
to similar children who were not. Here I exploit the differential rollout of state welfare
waivers and TANF implementation between the years of 1992 to 1997 to estimate a
triple difference model. I compare the outcomes of children who were exposed to
welfare reform to those who were not, taking likelihood of welfare participation into
account. The model takes the form:
Yistb = γWisb + δTi + β(Wisb ∗ Ti) + ΓXistb + ηt + ηs + ηb + uistb, (3.1)
where i denotes the individual, t the interview year, s the state of residence, and b the
birth year. Yistb is the outcome of interest, Wisb indicates exposure to welfare reform,
Ti takes a value of one if the child is from a low-educated single mother household,
Xistb is a vector of demographic and state level controls, ηt, ηs, and ηb are interview
year, state, and birth year fixed effects, respectively. Lastly, uistb is the error term
that is assumed to be uncorrelated with the covariates. All reported standard errors
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are clustered at the state level. As is common in the literature, low-educated refers to
having twelve years of education or less. Here, mother means biological, step, adoptive
mother, or grandmother. Children in the comparison group come from single mother
households where the mother has some college education and two parent households
where neither parent has a college degree. Any children from households with a
college-educated parent are omitted from the analysis.
For the main independent variable, Wisb, I follow the approach of Hoynes et al.
(2016) and measure how much of the individual’s life before the age of five they were
exposed to welfare reform. The variable is the share of months between conception and
the age of five that either welfare waivers or TANF were in place in their state. Given
the evidence from Kaestner and Lee (2005) that welfare reform affects a mother’s
prenatal decision it is important to account for welfare reform exposure that occurs
in-utero. The variable takes a value of 0 if the child turned five before any welfare
reform was implemented in their state and a value of 1 if they were conceived after
welfare reform.4 Any in-between value will be some fraction expressed as x/69 where
x is the number of months they were exposed. Major welfare waiver and TANF
implementation dates are taken from Crouse (1999).
This method is different from natural experiments that are episodic, in that they
“turn on” and then later “turn off.” Here, once a state reforms its AFDC program
either through welfare waivers or by implementing TANF, it keeps the reform and does
not revert or “turn off.” This restricts the comparisons that can be made because there
will never a child that was exposed in early childhood, but not later childhood. As
such, comparisons are about additional welfare reform exposure earlier in childhood,
conditional on having it later in childhood as well.
4I assume a 9 month gestation period between birth and conception
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Interpreting the coefficients from equation (3.1), γ is the own effect of full welfare
reform exposure and δ is the own effect of growing up in a disadvantaged low-educated,
single mother household that is at risk of being affected by welfare reform. The pa-
rameter of interest is then β and represents the impact of full welfare reform exposure,
being exposed from conception to age 5, for someone who’s likely to be affected by
welfare reform. This means that β is an intent-to-treat estimate. Because going from
zero months of exposure to sixty-nine months of exposure can be seen as a drastic
change, I also present treatment estimates at the mean level of exposure. Looking at
the mean level of exposure gives me an average intent-to-treat effect (AITT). This
assumes that all children of single low-educated mothers were affected by welfare re-
form. Note that γ then represents the impact of welfare reform exposure on someone
who is not at-risk to take up AFDC/TANF. As such I expect the coefficient to be
zero. Identification of β is given by variation in states’ passage of welfare waivers and
TANF, the birth year of the children, and their family status. The model assumes
there is no difference in health trends between children of low-educated single mothers
and the comparison group before the implementation of welfare reform.
In the model, the outcomes include a wide variety of health measures. I examine
the child’s insurance coverage as well as the composition of coverage to see if children
affected by welfare reform switch from types of coverage. Healthcare utilization is
also examined as a measure of a health investment. I examine varying degrees of
utilization from annual checkups for the children to more severe cases of visits for
injury. Lastly, given their importance for later life outcomes, I test if the children
have any change in the incidence of chronic health conditions as well as subjective
measures of health status.
To try to control for unobserved family characteristics such as genetics that may
affect a child’s health status, in section 3.4.3 I present results from a model with
family fixed effects, meaning uistb is correlated with the X ′s. Here the sample only
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includes individuals that have a sibling in the data as well. That empirical model can
be written as
Ỹistb = γW̃isb + β(W̃isb ∗ Ti) + ΓX̃istb + ηt + ηs + ηb + uistb, (3.2)
where ˜ indicates the family-time-demeaned variable. This model compares indi-
viduals who were exposed to welfare reform to their siblings that were not exposed
while sweeping out time-invariant family characteristics. In this model, identification
comes from pairs of siblings with different amounts of welfare exposure due to being
born at different times.
3.3.2 Data
Data for this project comes from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID)
and its supplement the Child Development Supplement (CDS). The PSID is longest
running longitudinal survey, starting with 4,802 households in 1968 and still follows
all members and descendants to this day. In 1997, the PSID supplemented its main
data collection with additional information on 3,563 0-12 year-old children and their
parents for the CDS. The children were drawn at random from participating core
families with the condition that there cannot be more than 2 children from any
household. The children were followed up twice after the 1997 survey, once in 2002 and
again in 2007. Children stayed in the CDS until they turned eighteen. Information
about the children was collected from their Primary Care Giver (PCG), typically
the child’s mother. I assign family status and state of residency to the child using
information from the 1997 wave for computing their welfare exposure and treatment.
The CDS was started to help facilitate research on “the consequences of family
events and circumstances such as family structure and income during the years chil-
dren are living with their parents for children’s educational and economic successes as
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young adults” (Hofferth et al., 1997). Previous data collection on children in the PSID
had been limited to simple demographic information such as age, sex, and education.
The CDS added extensive assessments of the cognitive, emotional, and health status
of the surveyed children. The supplement thoroughly explores child health following
birth with questions covering healthcare utilization, doctor diagnosed chronic condi-
tions, and subjective measures of health. Information on health insurance coverage
can be found in the CDS in addition to the core PSID individual file.
Given the extensive data collection, I have a wide-array of health outcomes to
examine. For healthcare utilization, I use a number of measures that capture varying
degrees of severity to allow me to test how responsive the family is to the changes
from welfare reform. These outcomes range from if the child had their recommended
annual to checkup to if they’ve visited the doctor for illness or injury. I also narrow
down the measures of health status to two measures of chronic conditions and two
subjective measures of health. Given the importance of physical chronic conditions
and mental chronic conditions in the literature, (Case et al., 2005; Currie et al.,
2010), I examine the impact of welfare reform on doctor diagnosed cases of asthma
and hyperactivity/ADHD.
Subjective measures of health can also measure child wellbeing and are often used
in the literature. My first measure of subjective health is if the PCG reports that
the child has any limits on usual childhood activities such as participating in games
or sports, attending school regularly, or doing regular school work. The second is
a composite measure developed by Erickson et al. (1995) and used by Johnson and
Schoeni (2011) and Halliday et al. (2019) that incorporates the PCG rated health of
the child and the severity of any limitations the child may have on activities.
The composite measure converts rated health and activity limitations to a con-
tinuous measure of health that is akin to healthy life years. Each PCG can rate their
child as being in “excellent, very good, good, fair, or poor” health. Additionally, each
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child can have either no limit on activities, limited in a minor activity, or limited in
their major activity. For children under 5, their major activity is play and for children
5 and older their major activity is attending school. These 15 discrete health states
are then assigned a numerical value that are shown in Table 3.1. For example, a
child that is in very good health with a limit on a minor activity has a health quality
measure of 0.79 suggesting they are at 79 percent of full function for the year.
Survey weighted descriptive statistics for the child health outcomes and relevant
controls can be found in Table 4.1. The average level of welfare reform exposure for
the sample is 0.33 which translates to an average length of welfare reform exposure
of approximately twenty-three months or almost two years. In the sample, there
are 2,418 observations of children with no welfare reform exposure and 3,076 with
a nonzero amount of exposure. For these children with welfare reform exposure,
the average amount is 0.55 which is thirty-eight months of exposure. Twenty-one
percent of the sample is from an at-risk household which is a household headed by a
low-educated single mother.
For the insurance outcomes, nearly 90 percent of the children have some form
on insurance, with 60 percent having some kind of private insurance and 33 percent
having some form of public insurance. The health insurance questions are a two year
retrospective which leads to some PCG reporting that their child has multiple forms
of insurance over the time period. This results in the totals exceeding the amount
that have at least one kind of insurance. The 89 percent coverage rate is roughly in
line with the U.S. Census reported rates for all children under 18 during the time
period (Bennefield, 1998; Mills and Bhandari, 2003; DeNavas-Walt et al., 2008).
I examine a variety of healthcare utilization measures to test for the impact of wel-
fare reform on this particular health input. These measures range in severity/necessity
and include having an annual checkup and visiting the doctor in the past year for
illness or injury. The sample means reflect the severity of these visits. Annual check-
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ups and visits for illness are the most common at 77 and 62 percent, respectively.
Visits for injury are more rare with 19 percent of the observations recording a visit
for injury in the past year. For health status, having a chronic condition as a child
is uncommon with 13 percent reporting having a diagnosed case of asthma and 7
percent a case of hyperactivity/ADHD. PCGs are also unlikely to report their child
to have a limiting condition and the average child has full function 93 percent of the
year, which is in line with Erickson et al. (1995) estimates who used the National
Health Interview Survey.
I control for child and household demographics by including family composition
and information about the child’s mother. To try to control for genetics and common
environment outside of the family fixed effect model, I also control for the mother’s
self rated health. Specifically this includes an indicator if the mother reports being in
excellent health and an indicator if the mother reports being in poor health, the best
and worst levels of self reported health. Ideally, I would control for the mother’s past
health and health behaviors as well, particularly during the prenatal period for each
child, but that data is not consistently available. State controls are used to try to
account for the local macroeconomy and the generosity of the state’s welfare system.
State EITC rates are reported as a percentage of the federal credit. Information on
state controls comes from the University of Kentucky Center for Poverty Research
(2016) Welfare Data with the exception of Medicaid expenditure per enrollee which
comes from Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. The minimum wage, Medicaid




I first present results for overall insurance status and healthcare utilization. If
welfare reform is affecting the inputs of the health production function, I may then
expect to see changes in the health status of at-risk children with welfare reform
exposure. These results are shown in Table 3.3. In this table and the following
tables, the coefficient for welfare treatment corresponds to β, the coefficient for welfare
exposure corresponds to γ, and being from an at-risk household corresponds to δ from
equations (3.1) & (3.2). For welfare treatment, the interpretation of the coefficient is
the effect of an at-risk child going from no welfare reform exposure before the age of
five to full welfare reform exposure before the age of 5.
Table 3.3 shows the effect of welfare reform on varying measures of healthcare
utilization and total insurance coverage. At-risk children who were exposed to welfare
reform in their early life are less likely to have used any of the measures of utilization
in the past year. A fully treated child at-risk of being affected by welfare reform is
11 percent less likely to have had their annual checkup. While this effect may seem
large, it is important to remember that full welfare reform exposure is a two standard
deviation increase from the mean level of exposure. As such, it is more reasonable to
interpret these effects at the mean level of treatment. At the mean level of treatment,
these children are 3.6 percent less likely to have had their annual checkup. There is
no statistically significant change to the likelihood of visiting the doctor for illness or
injury though both of the coefficients are negative. Given that these types of visits
are more necessary and potentially cover severe ailments, it is perhaps not surprising
the see a lack of a significant result. The own effect of welfare reform on a child not
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likely to be affected is not statistically different from zero, as expected. Interestingly,
children from disadvantaged households are not any more or less likely to utilize
healthcare or be insured compared to their more advantaged counterparts.
These decreases in utilization are intriguing despite the positive, though statis-
tically insignificant, effect of welfare reform on insurance coverage. While there is
no precisely measured change in net insurance coverage, it could be the case that
the composition of coverage changed. It is perhaps the case that following welfare
reform more children are covered by less generous private plans and then decrease
their utilization. The results for the composition of insurance coverage in shown in
Table 3.4.
Table 3.4 shows on net no change to the health insurance coverage of children
affected by welfare reform. The first column shows the effects of welfare reform
on total coverage as seen in Table 3.3, with the remaining columns showing private
coverage and public coverage, respectively. The likelihood of having private insurance
does increase, which is consistent with the results for mothers. The positive coefficient
for public coverage, however, is also positive which is consistent with the Medicaid
expansions. Though none of these effects are statistically significant at traditional
levels. The results also show that children from disadvantaged, low-educated single
mother households are much less likely to have private coverage and are much more
likely to have public coverage. The own effect of welfare on a child not likely to be
affected is not statistically different from zero, as expected.
In terms of health production inputs, the evidence so far suggests a slight decrease
in utilization in the form of fewer checkups and no significant change to insurance
coverage. I now turn to various measures of health output to examine the impact
of welfare reform. These results are shown in Table 3.5. The results are suggestive
of improvements to child health. Children treated by welfare reform are much less
likely to be diagnosed with asthma and have a higher health quality measure. Fully
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treated children are 54 percent less likely to have a doctor diagnosed case of asthma,
while at the mean level of exposure, these children are nearly 18 percent less likely to
have asthma. Similarly, treated children also have higher levels of health quality. The
coefficient suggests a fully treated child would increase their healthy, full function days
by 10.2 days year. A child with the mean level of exposure will have 3.3 more healthy,
full function days a year.5 The effect of welfare reform on hyperactivity/ADHD and
having any limit on activities is negative, but it is not statistically significant at any
traditional level.
Table 3.5 also shows the health discrepancies between children from at-risk families
and children from more advantaged households. Children from disadvantaged families
are much more likely to have a diagnosed case of hyperactivity/ADHD, have a limit
on their activities, and have a lower measure of health quality. Troubling here are the
significant coefficient for the own effect of welfare reform. However, as seen in section
3.4.3, the effects either attenuate or are eliminated altogether in the model with
state-time fixed effects, suggesting there may be state-specific time trends driving the
results.
Initially, the results presented here may seem unintuitive. Welfare reform is asso-
ciated with a decrease in healthcare utilization but a general improvement in health
status. The relationship between healthcare utilization and status may run in both
directions. Increased doctor visits may improve health, but also parents of healthy
children may not feel the need to regularly utilize healthcare services, particularly
more preventative care such as an annual checkup. In the latter case, welfare re-
form induced improvements in health would then also be associated with a decline
in utilization. To analyze the direction of this relationship, I use an ad hoc approach
and regress contemporaneous health quality and annual checkup and vice-versa along
50.028× 365 = 10.2 days. 0.009× 365 = 3.3 days.
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with models with a lagged independent variable. Where the lagged model can assess
if healthcare today is associated with better future health or if health status today is
associated with less future care. These results are shown in Table 3.6.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3.6 show the relationship between the child’s health
quality and having an annual checkup. Column (1) shows their contemporaneous re-
lationship while column (2) uses the lag of health quality as the explanatory variable.
Columns (3) and (4) reverse the relationship with column (4) showing the effect of
lagged annual checkup on health quality. Columns (1) and (3) show a contempo-
raneous correlation between the two measures. Higher levels of health quality are
negatively correlated with having an annual checkup. Columns (2) and (4) are sug-
gestive of healthy children opting for less future healthcare rather than healthcare
utilization influencing future health. Higher levels of health quality last period are
associated with a significant reduction in the likelihood of future annual checkups
while having an annual checkup is not associated with better future health. If welfare
reform is inducing improved health status, then we should then expect utilization to
fall as well.
The results here present an interesting parallel to the welfare reform research
on the health status of mothers following PRWORA (Bitler et al., 2005; Kaestner
and Tarlov, 2006). There is a similar decrease in utilization as measured by having
annual checkups and some evidence of a shift to private coverage. However, the results
suggest improvements to childhood health given the significant results for asthma and
health quality and the negative coefficients for the other measures. As shown in the
research of Case et al. (2005) and Currie et al. (2010), this reduction in a chronic
health condition as a child could have important consequences for later life adult
health. The results for the whole sample may also be masking important differences
in the health status of children by race.
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3.4.2 Results by Race
Given that the existing literature finds important differences in the effect of welfare
reform by race, I also test if the children of welfare reform have different health
outcomes by race. I re-estimate equation (3.1) for the subsamples of white non-
Hispanic children and black non-Hispanic children. The results are shown in Tables
3.7, 3.8, and 3.9 where panel (a) shows the results for white children and panel (b)
shows the results for black children. Table 3.7 shows the results for total insurance
coverage and healthcare utilization. Interestingly, the welfare reform induced changes
in health care utilization seem to be driven entirely by white children. White children
treated by welfare reform are 6.5 percent less likely to have had their annual checkup
at the mean level of welfare reform exposure.6 The healthcare utilization of black
children is unchanged after welfare reform with the coefficients being an order of
magnitude smaller than for white children. Though the coefficients here are negative
as well. Disadvantaged children from either group also do not have different levels of
healthcare utilization compared to children from more advantaged households.
Again, I explore if differences in insurance composition could be driving the
changes in healthcare utilization. These results are shown in Table 3.8. Similar
to the whole sample, neither group is statistically more likely to have insurance cov-
erage. Though when split into the two subsamples, the results show an almost equal
and opposite effects on the likelihood of having private or public insurance for both
groups. White children are 5.7 perrcentage points more likely to have private insur-
ance and 6.4 percentage points less likely to have public insurance. Black children are
6.1 percentage points more likely to have private insurance coverage and 5.3 percent-
age points less likely to have public coverage. This decline in public insurance with
6It should be noted that black children have, on average, slightly less welfare reform exposure
that white children. White children average twenty-three months of exposure while black children
average eighteen months of exposure.
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the gain in private coverage mirrors the research on the coverage of mothers, though
the effects here are not statistically significant. As with the whole sample results,
children from disadvantaged families are much less likely to have private insurance
coverage and are more likely to have public insurance.
Table 3.9 shows the effect of welfare reform on health status. Although white
children saw the largest changes to their healthcare utilization, they show improve-
ments in health status in the form of higher rated health quality. The coefficient here
suggesting an improvement of 15 days of full function for those with full exposure
and 5 days for a mean level of exposure. Black children also see gains to their health
quality and have a reduction in diagnosed cases of asthma and having a reported
limit on activities. At the mean level of exposure, treated children have a 19 percent
reduction in asthma and a 14 percent reduction in having a limit on their activities.
Despite these sizable changes in chronic health and activity limits, the improvements
to health quality are more modest than those found for white children. For black chil-
dren, full welfare reform exposure there is an improvement of 7 days of full function
and 2 days more for those with a mean level of exposure.
One possible concern from the results in Tables 3.3 & 3.5, is that there is a de-
crease in doctor diagnosed cases of asthma simply because children are visiting the
doctor less often. However, as seen in panel (b) of Tables 3.7 & 3.9 the reduction
in asthma is being driven almost entirely from black children who are also not any
more or less likely to have visited the doctor for their annual checkup. Given that
African Americans are much more likely to suffer from asthma (Barnes et al., 2007),
this suggest there is a meaningful improvement in health instead of cases going un-
derreported. One possible explanation for this drop in asthma rates may stem from
the work requirements. As mothers were moved to work, they have less time to spend
caring for their children and may opt for formal or informal care as a substitute. As
Fuller et al. (2002) note, initially mothers tend to opt for informal child care but as
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they move into more stable jobs they opt for formal child care centers. If either of
these options provides a cleaner or more hygienic environment for the child that is
perhaps smoke or mold free, asthma rates may fall.
3.4.3 Robustness Checks
To test for the sensitivity of my results to the inclusion of particular control
variables, I re-estimate equation (3.1) adding in the control variables sequentially.
Here I focus on the health quality outcome as it was significant across both the white
and black samples of children. These results are seen in Table 3.10. Column (1) shows
the results with no controls added, (2) with child/household demographic information
included, (3) with mother information, and (4) with state controls. For identification,
the state, year, and birth-cohort fixed effects are included in each specification. Table
3.10 shows that the effect of welfare treatment is very robust to the inclusion of
varying controls. The effect of being from an at-risk household does attenuate as
more controls are added, specifically information about the child’s mother.
Next, to try to better control for the role genetics and other fixed family char-
acteristics have on health, I re-estimate the outcomes from Tables 3.3 & 3.5 using
a model that incorporates family fixed effects as shown in equation (3.2). Here the
sample only includes individuals that have a sibling in the CDS as well. These re-
sults are presented in Tables 3.11 & 3.12. The results for healthcare utilization are
largely unchanged. Welfare reform is associated with a decline in multiple measures
of doctor visits, but is only statistically significant in the case of having an annual
checkup. Here children with the mean level of exposure are 5 percent less likely to
have had a checkup in the past year. For health status, the coefficients are generally
larger in magnitude but of the same sign as in Table 3.5. Children with a mean level
of exposure are 43 percent less likely to have asthma and are 61 percent less likely to
have a limiting condition. The effect of welfare reform on health quality is also similar
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to the whole sample results, though slightly larger. One possible explanation for the
larger magnitudes comes from Currie and Almond (2011). If parents are reinforcing
shocks induced by welfare reform as opposed to compensating for them, then the
fixed effect estimate is a combination of reaction to the shock as well as the shock
itself, causing the estimates to overstate the true effect of the shock.
I now turn my attention to the possibility of endogenous migration. To this
point there have been no restrictions on the individuals staying in the same state
all throughout childhood. If parents and their children migrated in response to wel-
fare generosity, then the movement would be endogenous and bias the results of the
model. To address this, I re-estimate equation (3.1), for utilization and health status
outcomes, on individuals who never moved states during childhood. These results are
shown in Tables 3.13 and 3.14. For healthcare utilization, the results are unchanged
in sign and relative magnitude compared to the baseline estimates. Treated children
with an average amount of welfare reform exposure are 3.3 percent less likely to have
an annual checkup.
For health status, shown in Table 3.14, the results are also similar in magnitude
to the baseline results in Table 3.5. In this specification, welfare reform does not have
a statistically significant impact on asthma but the coefficients are near identical in
magnitude, the effect is less precisely estimated with the smaller sample size. The
effect of welfare reform on health quality is also unchanged, with children receiving
full exposure having almost 11 more full function days and those with the mean level
of exposure having 3 more healthy days.
Lastly, one might also be concerned about the effect of changing state policies
over the same time period as the analysis, such as Medicaid expansion or SNAP
liberalization, that won’t be captured by state and survey year fixed effects. To
control for any state specific time trends I re-estimate equation (3.1) and include
state-year fixed effects. These results are shown in Tables 3.15 & 3.16. Here the
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results are also unchanged from the baseline estimates, suggesting that the results
are not driven by other changing state specific policies. Compared to the baseline
results in Table 3.5, the added fixed effects attenuate the results for the own effect
of welfare reform on children not likely to be affected by the rule changes. Here the
coefficients for asthma and hyperactivity are not statistically different from zero, as
expected.
3.5 Conclusion
Childhood well-being is a multifaceted measure of interrelated individual, family,
and community level factors. These factors are important not only for the immediate
happiness and livelihood of a child, but also because of the long-reaching impacts
childhood circumstance can have on outcomes throughout the course of their life.
Among the most important of these factors is childhood health. This paper presents
new evidence on the effect of welfare reform on not only childhood health inputs but
also objective and subjective measures of health status on a representative sample
of children. Using data from a special supplement of the PSID, I find that at-risk
children who were exposed to welfare reform are 3-5 percent less likely to have had
their annual checkup, are 17 percent less likely to be diagnosed with asthma, have
3 more healthy, full function days a year. The results are robust to the inclusion
of family fixed effects, the sample of nonmovers, and the inclusion of state specific
time trends. However, the results for the whole sample mask important differences in
health outcomes by race. The decline in healthcare utilization is concentrated among
white children, while black children are much less likely to be diagnosed with asthma.
Both groups, however, report higher quality health.
As noted in the literature, the full ramifications of shocks to childhood health may
be latent and not realized until much later in life. As Case et al. (2005) note, the
relationship between early childhood health and later life health grows stronger over
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time. The results here suggest a potentially mixed impact of welfare reform on later
life health. Checkups are an important clinical instrument for preventing future illness
in children (Chung et al., 2006). If children from disadvantaged families are using
less preventative care, then they could face greater health discrepancies as adults.
However, given the impact of childhood chronic health conditions (Case et al., 2005;
Currie et al., 2010), welfare reform could be associated with a reduction in health and
socioeconomic discrepancies among African Americans. This uncertainty highlights
the importance of future study. As the children of welfare reform age, this presents a
promising and important avenue of research to contribute to the emerging literature




Figure 3.1: Welfare Reform Implementation Year, By State
Table 3.1: Health Quality Measure
PCG Rated Health
Activity Limitation Excellent Very Good Good Fair Poor
Not Limited 1 0.92 0.84 0.63 0.47
Limited - Minor 0.87 0.79 0.72 0.52 0.38
Limited - Major 0.81 0.74 0.67 0.48 0.34
Source: Erickson et al. (1995). For formulation see authors’ Technical Notes section.
For children under 5 major activity is play and for chidlren 5 and older the major
activity is attending school. For children under 5 minor activity is attending school
or doing school work and for children 5 and older the minor activity is play or doing
school work.
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics - Child Development Supplement
Mean SD Observations
Welfare Exposure 0.33 0.36 5224
Raised by Low Edu. Single Mother 0.21 0.41 5224
Health Insurance
Insured 0.90 0.31 5224
Private Insurance 0.60 0.49 5224
Public Insurance 0.33 0.47 5224
Healthcare Utilization
Had Annual Checkup 0.77 0.42 5224
Visited for Illness 0.62 0.48 5224
Visited for Injury 0.19 0.39 5224
Health Outcomes
Asthma 0.13 0.34 5224
Hyperactive 0.07 0.26 5224
Limit on Activities 0.08 0.27 5224
Health Quality 0.93 0.10 5224
Demographics
Child Age 10.6 4.7 5224
Male 0.50 0.50 5224
White 0.55 0.50 5224
Black 0.19 0.40 5224
Number of Siblings 1.45 1.17 5224
Mother Age 37.4 8.2 5224
Mother Less than HS Edu. 0.32 0.47 5224
Mother HS Degree 0.39 0.49 5224
Mother Some College Edu. 0.30 0.46 5224
Mother Excel. Self Health 0.20 0.40 5224
Mother Poor Self Health 0.03 0.16 5224
Raised By Grandparents 0.03 0.16 5224
Urban 0.61 0.49 5224
State Controls
Unemployment rate 5.27 1.06 5224
State Minimum Wage 6.31 0.83 5224
State EITC Rate 0.03 0.08 5224
Medicaid Exp. per Enrollee 6428 2170 5224
Maximum TANF Benefit 2-Person 381 146 5224
Maximum TANF Benefit 3-Person 474 183 5224
Maximum TANF Benefit 4-Person 556 209 5224
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Table 3.3: Childhood Health Insurance & Utilization
Insured Annual Checkup Illness Visit Injury Visit
Welfare Treatment (β) 0.044 -0.085** -0.027 -0.037
(0.030) (0.033) (0.052) (0.031)
Welfare Exposure (γ) -0.011 0.043 0.028 -0.000
(0.024) (0.032) (0.053) (0.041)
At-Risk (δ) 0.010 0.024 -0.027 0.027
(0.019) (0.023) (0.029) (0.023)
Outcome Mean 0.90 0.77 0.62 0.19
Percent Change 4.90 -10.96 -4.33 -19.72
Treatment at Mean Wisb 0.014 -0.028 -0.009 -0.012
Perc. Change at Mean 1.61 -3.59 -1.42 -6.47
Obs. 5,224 5,224 5,224 5,224
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level, * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p
<0.01. Controls include child gender, child race, number of siblings, child age, mother
age, mother health, mother education, urban residency, state unemployment rate, state
minimum wage, state EITC, state Medicaid expenditures per enrollee, maximum TANF
benefit for 2,3,4 person families. State, interview year, and birth-year fixed effects
included.
Table 3.4: Childhood Health Insurance Composition
Insured Private Insurance Public Insurance
Welfare Treatment (β) 0.044 0.037 0.008
(0.030) (0.055) (0.064)
Welfare Exposure (γ) -0.011 0.015 -0.030
(0.024) (0.054) (0.063)
At-Risk (δ) 0.010 -0.218*** 0.237***
(0.019) (0.034) (0.033)
Outcome Mean 0.90 0.60 0.33
Percent Change 4.90 6.21 2.35
Treatment at Mean Wisb 0.014 0.012 0.003
Perc. Change at Mean 1.61 2.04 0.77
Obs. 5,224 5,224 5,224
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level, * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, ***
p <0.01. Controls include child gender, child race, number of siblings, child
age, mother age, mother health, mother education, if raised by grandparent,
urban residency, state unemployment rate, state minimum wage, state EITC,
state Medicaid expenditures per enrollee, maximum TANF benefit for 2,3,4
person families. State, interview year, and birth-year fixed effects included.
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Table 3.5: Childhood Health Status
Asthma Hyperactive Activity Limit Health Quality
Welfare Treatment (β) -0.076* -0.002 -0.040 0.028***
(0.041) (0.028) (0.025) (0.008)
Welfare Exposure (γ) 0.080* -0.050* -0.003 -0.022**
(0.042) (0.029) (0.027) (0.010)
At-Risk (δ) 0.001 0.024** 0.037*** -0.015***
(0.021) (0.010) (0.013) (0.005)
Outcome Mean 0.13 0.07 0.08 0.93
Percent Change -56.63 -3.14 -50.39 3.07
Treatment at Mean Wisb -0.025 -0.001 -0.013 0.009
Perc. Change at Mean -18.57 -1.03 -16.53 1.01
Obs. 5,224 5,224 5,224 5,224
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level, * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Controls include child gender, child race, number of siblings, child age, mother age,
mother health, mother education, if raised by grandparent, urban residency, state un-
employment rate, state minimum wage, state EITC, state Medicaid expenditures per
enrollee, maximum TANF benefit for 2,3,4 person families. State, interview year, and
birth-year fixed effects included.
Table 3.6: The Timing of Health Status and Utilization
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Checkup Checkup Health Quality Health Quality
Health Quality -0.221*** — — —
(0.042)
Health Quality Lag — -0.186*** — —
(0.057)
Checkup — — -0.014*** —
(0.003)
Checkup Lag — — — -0.005
(0.006)
Obs. 5,224 2,803 5,224 2,779
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level, * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, ***
p <0.01. Controls include child gender, child race, number of siblings, child age,
mother age, mother health, mother education, urban residency, state unemploy-
ment rate, state minimum wage, state EITC, state Medicaid expenditures per
enrollee, maximum TANF benefit for 2,3,4 person families. State, interview year,
and birth-year fixed effects included.
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Table 3.7: Childhood Health Insurance & Utilization - By Race
(a) White Children
Insured Annual Checkup Illness Visit Injury Visit
Welfare Treatment (β) 0.027 -0.159** -0.166 -0.103
(0.065) (0.074) (0.102) (0.065)
Welfare Exposure (γ) -0.038 0.059 0.030 -0.047
(0.030) (0.067) (0.072) (0.078)
At-Risk (δ) -0.048 -0.008 0.054 0.040
(0.040) (0.046) (0.052) (0.045)
Outcome Mean 0.93 0.74 0.69 0.21
Percent Change 2.94 -21.41 -24.02 -48.51
Treatment at Mean Wisb 0.009 -0.052 -0.054 -0.034
Perc. Change at Mean 0.96 -7.00 -7.85 -15.85
Obs. 2,006 2,006 2,006 2,006
(b) Black Children
Insured Annual Checkup Illness Visit Injury Visit
Welfare Treatment (β) 0.000 -0.010 -0.021 -0.017
(0.042) (0.050) (0.082) (0.038)
Welfare Exposure (γ) 0.027 0.006 0.069 0.004
(0.039) (0.039) (0.073) (0.051)
At-Risk (δ) 0.018 0.001 -0.042 -0.002
(0.024) (0.030) (0.031) (0.020)
Outcome Mean 0.92 0.87 0.54 0.17
Percent Change 0.02 -1.16 -3.85 -9.52
Treatment at Mean Wisb 0.000 -0.003 -0.005 -0.004
Perc. Change at Mean 0.00 -0.30 -1.00 -2.48
Obs. 2,508 2,508 2,508 2,508
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level, * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Controls include child gender, number of siblings, child age, mother age, mother
health, mother education, urban residency, state unemployment rate, state minimum
wage, state EITC, state Medicaid expenditures per enrollee, maximum TANF benefit
for 2,3,4 person families. State, interview year, and birth-year fixed effects included.
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Table 3.8: Childhood Health Insurance Composition - By Race
(a) White Children
Insured Private Insurance Public Insurance
Welfare Treatment (β) 0.027 0.057 -0.064
(0.065) (0.120) (0.079)
Welfare Exposure (γ) -0.038 0.020 -0.061
(0.030) (0.071) (0.061)
At-Risk (δ) -0.048 -0.202*** 0.194***
(0.040) (0.055) (0.055)
Outcome Mean 0.93 0.77 0.19
Percent Change 2.94 7.46 -33.78
Treatment at Mean Wisb 0.009 0.019 -0.021
Perc. Change at Mean 0.96 2.44 -11.04
Obs. 2,006 2,006 2,006
(b) Black Children
Insured Private Insurance Public Insurance
Welfare Treatment (β) 0.000 0.061 -0.053
(0.042) (0.073) (0.093)
Welfare Exposure (γ) 0.027 0.136 -0.080
(0.039) (0.118) (0.146)
At-Risk (δ) 0.018 -0.295*** 0.314***
(0.024) (0.044) (0.041)
Outcome Mean 0.92 0.44 0.52
Percent Change 0.02 13.64 -10.26
Treatment at Mean Wisb 0.000 0.016 -0.014
Perc. Change at Mean 0.00 3.55 -2.67
Obs. 2,508 2,508 2,508
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level, * p <0.10, ** p <0.05,
*** p <0.01. Controls include child gender, number of siblings, child age,
mother age, mother health, mother education, if raised by grandparent, urban
residency, state unemployment rate, state minimum wage, state EITC, state
Medicaid expenditures per enrollee, maximum TANF benefit for 2,3,4 person
families. State, interview year, and birth-year fixed effects included.
77
Table 3.9: Childhood Health Status - By Race
(a) White Children
Asthma Hyperactive Activity Limit Health Quality
Welfare Treatment (β) -0.051 -0.015 -0.011 0.043***
(0.081) (0.073) (0.054) (0.015)
Welfare Exposure (γ) 0.127* -0.054 0.015 -0.009
(0.070) (0.045) (0.043) (0.016)
At-Risk (δ) -0.023 0.030 -0.001 -0.011
(0.037) (0.030) (0.027) (0.009)
Outcome Mean 0.13 0.08 0.08 0.94
Percent Change -38.10 -19.25 -13.40 4.58
Treatment at Mean Wisb -0.017 -0.005 -0.003 0.014
Perc. Change at Mean -12.45 -6.29 -4.38 1.50
Obs. 2,006 2,006 2,006 2,006
(b) Black Children
Asthma Hyperactive Activity Limit Health Quality
Welfare Treatment (β) -0.117*** 0.012 -0.042* 0.021**
(0.038) (0.033) (0.023) (0.010)
Welfare Exposure (γ) 0.074 -0.061* -0.032 -0.021
(0.064) (0.036) (0.049) (0.020)
At-Risk (δ) 0.022 0.010 0.044** -0.016**
(0.037) (0.020) (0.019) (0.007)
Outcome Mean 0.16 0.09 0.08 0.91
Percent Change -74.56 13.27 -54.59 2.35
Treatment at Mean Wisb -0.030 0.003 -0.011 0.006
Perc. Change at Mean -19.39 3.45 -14.20 0.61
Obs. 2,508 2,508 2,508 2,508
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level, * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Controls include child gender, number of siblings, child age, mother age, mother health,
mother education, if raised by grandparent, urban residency, state unemployment rate,
state minimum wage, state EITC, state Medicaid expenditures per enrollee, maximum
TANF benefit for 2,3,4 person families. State, interview year, and birth-year fixed effects
included.
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Table 3.10: Childhood Health Quality
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Welfare Treatment (β) 0.027*** 0.026*** 0.028*** 0.028***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
Welfare Exposure (γ) -0.022** -0.023** -0.022** -0.022**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
At-Risk (δ) -0.024*** -0.021*** -0.015*** -0.015***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Demographics NO YES YES YES
Mother Controls NO NO YES YES
State Controls NO NO NO YES
Obs. 5,224 5,224 5,224 5,224
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level, * p <0.10, ** p <0.05,
*** p <0.01. Child/HH Controls: child age, child gender, child race, num-
ber of siblings, if raised by grandparent, and urban residency. Mother
Controls: mother age, mother health, and mother education. State Con-
trols: state unemployment rate, state minimum wage, state EITC, state
Medicaid expenditures per enrollee, and maximum TANF benefit for 2,3,4
person families. State, interview year, and birth-year fixed effects included
in each specification.
Table 3.11: Childhood Health Insurance & Utilization - Family Fixed
Effects
Insured Annual Checkup Illness Visit Injury Visit
Welfare Treatment (β) 0.008 -0.121* -0.082 -0.103
(0.038) (0.061) (0.064) (0.068)
Welfare Exposure (γ) -0.051 0.039 0.006 -0.001
(0.033) (0.037) (0.082) (0.053)
Outcome Mean 0.90 0.76 0.61 0.19
Percent Change 0.92 -16.01 -13.43 -55.03
Treatment at Mean Wisb 0.003 -0.038 -0.026 -0.033
Perc. Change at Mean 0.29 -5.04 -4.22 -17.31
Obs. 3,149 3,149 3,149 3,149
Sibling Pairs 696 696 696 696
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level, * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Controls include child gender, child race, number of siblings, child age, mother’s age,
urban residency, state unemployment rate, state minimum wage, state EITC, state
Medicaid expenditures per enrollee, maximum TANF benefit for 2,3,4 person families.
State, interview year, and birth-year fixed effects included.
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Table 3.12: Childhood Health Status - Family Fixed Effects
Asthma Hyperactive Activity Limit Health Quality
Welfare Treatment (β) -0.170* 0.052 -0.144*** 0.046**
(0.098) (0.050) (0.043) (0.022)
Welfare Exposure (γ) 0.042 -0.035 0.076** -0.027**
(0.073) (0.032) (0.035) (0.013)
Outcome Mean 0.12 0.07 0.07 0.93
Percent Change -100.00 70.69 -100.00 4.95
Treatment at Mean Wisb -0.053 0.016 -0.045 0.014
Perc. Change at Mean -43.69 22.24 -61.25 1.56
Obs. 3,149 3,149 3,149 3,149
Sibling Pairs 696 696 696 696
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level, * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Controls include child gender, child race, number of siblings, child age, mother’s age,
urban residency, state unemployment rate, state minimum wage, state EITC, state Med-
icaid expenditures per enrollee, maximum TANF benefit for 2,3,4 person families. State,
interview year, and birth-year fixed effects included.
Table 3.13: Childhood Health Insurance & Utilization - Nonmovers
Insured Annual Checkup Illness Visit Injury Visit
Welfare Treatment (β) 0.039 -0.078** -0.029 0.000
(0.034) (0.035) (0.062) (0.030)
Welfare Exposure (γ) -0.033 0.045 0.038 -0.025
(0.026) (0.044) (0.068) (0.041)
At-Risk (δ) 0.014 0.008 -0.039 0.012
(0.021) (0.024) (0.038) (0.025)
Outcome Mean 0.89 0.77 0.63 0.19
Percent Change 4.35 -10.13 -4.58 0.01
Treatment at Mean Wisb 0.013 -0.026 -0.010 0.000
Perc. Change at Mean 1.45 -3.37 -1.53 0.00
Obs. 4,265 4,265 4,265 4,265
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level, * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p
<0.01. Controls include child gender, child race, number of siblings, child age, mother
age, mother health, mother education, if raised by grandparent, urban residency, state
unemployment rate, state minimum wage, state EITC, state Medicaid expenditures
per enrollee, maximum TANF benefit for 2,3,4 person families. State, interview year,
and birth-year fixed effects included.
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Table 3.14: Childhood Health Status - Nonmovers
Asthma Hyperactive Activity Limit Health Quality
Welfare Treatment (β) -0.072 -0.001 -0.023 0.030***
(0.055) (0.036) (0.029) (0.009)
Welfare Exposure (γ) 0.097** -0.062* -0.005 -0.021*
(0.044) (0.032) (0.035) (0.011)
At-Risk (δ) -0.002 0.013 0.031** -0.012**
(0.025) (0.012) (0.013) (0.006)
Outcome Mean 0.13 0.07 0.08 0.93
Percent Change -54.35 -1.36 -28.65 3.28
Treatment at Mean Wisb -0.024 -0.000 -0.008 0.010
Perc. Change at Mean -18.12 -0.45 -9.55 1.09
Obs. 4,265 4,265 4,265 4,265
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level, * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Controls include child gender, child race, number of siblings, child age, mother age,
mother health, mother education, if raised by grandparent, urban residency, state un-
employment rate, state minimum wage, state EITC, state Medicaid expenditures per
enrollee, maximum TANF benefit for 2,3,4 person families. State, interview year, and
birth-year fixed effects included.
Table 3.15: Childhood Health Insurance & Utilization - Time Trends
Insured Annual Checkup Illness Visit Injury Visit
Welfare Treatment (β) 0.048 -0.082** -0.024 -0.039
(0.032) (0.034) (0.052) (0.031)
Welfare Exposure (γ) -0.017 0.033 0.021 0.000
(0.028) (0.031) (0.054) (0.037)
At-Risk (δ) 0.008 0.023 -0.029 0.027
(0.019) (0.023) (0.029) (0.023)
Outcome Mean 0.90 0.77 0.62 0.19
Percent Change 5.34 -10.66 -3.80 -20.81
Treatment at Mean Wisb 0.016 -0.027 -0.008 -0.013
Perc. Change at Mean 1.75 -3.50 -1.25 -6.83
Obs. 5,224 5,224 5,224 5,224
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level, * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p
<0.01. Controls include child gender, child race, number of siblings, child age, mother
age, mother health, mother education, if raised by grandparent, urban residency, state
unemployment rate, state minimum wage, state Medicaid expenditures per enrollee,
maximum TANF benefit for 2,3,4 person families. State, interview year, and birth-
year fixed effects included.
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Table 3.16: Childhood Health Status - Time Trends
Asthma Hyperactive Activity Limit Health Quality
Welfare Treatment (β) -0.075* -0.002 -0.036 0.028***
(0.042) (0.029) (0.026) (0.008)
Welfare Exposure (γ) 0.071 -0.043 -0.008 -0.021**
(0.045) (0.030) (0.030) (0.010)
At-Risk (δ) 0.001 0.024** 0.035*** -0.015***
(0.022) (0.010) (0.013) (0.005)
Outcome Mean 0.13 0.07 0.08 0.93
Percent Change -56.12 -3.24 -45.78 3.03
Treatment at Mean Wisb -0.025 -0.001 -0.012 0.009
Perc. Change at Mean -18.41 -1.06 -15.02 1.00
Obs. 5,224 5,224 5,224 5,224
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level, * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Controls include child gender, child race, number of siblings, child age, mother age,
mother health, mother education, if raised by grandparent, urban residency, state unem-
ployment rate, state minimum wage, state Medicaid expenditures per enrollee, maximum
TANF benefit for 2,3,4 person families. State, interview year, and birth-year fixed effects
included.
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Chapter 4: SNAP Purchasing Power and Nutrition Among Households
with Children
4.1 Introduction
The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), formerly “food stamps”,
is a federal program that provides nutrition benefits to low-income individuals and
families that are used at stores to purchase food. The program is administered by the
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Food and Nutrition Service (FNS)
through its nationwide network of FNS field offices. Research to date has found
that SNAP has been highly effective at alleviating poverty (Tiehen et al., 2015) and
improving food insecurity rates among participants (Nord and Prell, 2011; Gregory
et al., 2015; Schmidt et al., 2016). SNAP participation has also been shown to have
positive effects on health, particularly among children (Bitler, 2015; Bronchetti et al.,
2018).
However, there has been additional data to reflect that SNAP benefits may not be
adequate to address the nutritional needs of those participating in the program (Ziliak,
2016a). SNAP benefits are nationally legislated, and with the exception of Alaska
and Hawaii, are not adjusted to reflect local food costs. The time spent acquiring
ingredients and preparing meals is also not accounted for in the estimation of the
typical families food expenditures. Additionally, depending on the family dynamic,
these supplemental funds may not provide enough to meet nutritional outcomes for all
those in the households. Among those with an adolescent in the household, depending
on gender, activity level, and other key factors the SNAP benefit may not provide
an adequate amount to meet their increased nutritional needs due to the maximum
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benefit design. In addition, those caretakers with an adolescent in the household may
choose to skip meals or experience hunger in order to provide enough food for the
other members in the household.
Another specific family dynamic experiencing hunger is families with a lone mother;
with 34% of these caregivers reporting they skip meals or ate less when food was scarce
(McIntyre et al., 2003). Although families participating in SNAP are supposed to re-
ceive a benefit level to meet basic needs, the family dynamic of a lone mother may
influence dietary purchases relative to households that have two caregivers in the
home. The lone mother may need to “manage the process” (Radimer et al., 1990),
meaning that families strategize and work to avoid hunger (McIntyre et al., 2003).
The management of food falls more heavily on women given traditional roles about
family life and there are greater expectations on women for feeding and nurturing
their children (DeVault, 1994). This dynamic of care giver, especially among single
mothers, had led to recent studies indicating that this subpopulation reports worse
dietary intake, food insecurity, and higher BMI (Martin and Lippert, 2012). A current
study by Balisteri (2018) using data from multiple years of the Current Population
Survey Food Security Supplement found that children growing up in complex family
households are more vulnerable to food insecurity, on average, than children grow-
ing up in two biological married-parent households. Their results also show higher
odds of child food insecurity among single mother households than among married
biological or married stepfamilies suggesting a protective effect of marriage beyond
economic resources.
Together, these individual and cultural factors place households with children,
particularly single mother households or households with adolescents, at greater risk
of poverty, food insecurity, poor nutrition, and obesity. Yet, there is limited re-
search examining if additional income for food for those who are single mothers or
with an adolescent would improve their purchasing habits or if it would simply al-
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low households to purchase more food as a whole and not necessarily those with a
higher nutritional value. In this paper, I explore the impact of the purchasing power
of SNAP on the dietary quality of food acquisitions of households with children. I
measure purchasing power by accounting for food prices at the county level as well as
the increased dietary needs of adolescents. The sample includes SNAP and SNAP–
eligible households with children and includes households with adolescents and single
mother households. While other work such as Bronchetti et al. (2018) explores the
relationship between SNAP purchasing power and child health outcomes, this paper
uses finer geographic price information and household food diaries to test for one
possible mechanism of improved health: improved nutritional acquisitions.
Using data from the Food Acquisition and Purchase Survey (FoodAPS), a rich
dataset on household food acquisitions and county food prices from April 2012 to
January 2013, I find that a ten percent increase in purchasing power is associated with
increased per person weekly acquisition of grains, proteins, dairy, and vegetables by
1.5-2.5 percent. However the quantity of added sugars also increases by approximately
two percent. In line with these modest changes in quantity, I do not find a statistically
significant impact of purchasing power on food insecurity rates. Households with
adolescents and single mother households exhibit similar purchasing patterns. The
results are robust to an alternative measurement of the local food prices. The findings
here have implications for the public health benefits of SNAP and the purchasing
habits of disadvantaged households with children.
4.2 Background
The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program is the largest food assistance
program and one of the largest safety net programs in the United States. Benefits
are received monthly and can be used towards the purchase of food to be prepared in
the home. SNAP is somewhat unique among welfare programs in that conditional on
85
meeting the income requirements it offers universal access regardless of age, gender,
family or employment status. SNAP benefits in 2018 totaled more than 60.88 billion
dollars for an average of $125 per person per month. SNAP has been shown to be
beneficial on a variety of adult well-being measures including improving food security,
alleviating poverty, and improving health outcomes. However, there has been equal
criticism that SNAP may contribute to high rates of obesity and chronic disease
among those participating in the program (Pruitt et al., 2016). While others have
found that long-term participation decreases rates of obesity (Schmeiser, 2012; Hoynes
et al., 2016; Almada and Tchernis, 2018).
For children, SNAP is one of the largest anti-poverty programs, second only to the
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) (Renwick and Fox, 2016). In addition to improving
childhood food security (Kreider et al., 2012; Klerman et al., 2017) SNAP has been
shown to improve mutliple childhood health measures. Almond et al. (2011) exploit
the county-by-county rollout in food stamps in the 1960’s and find that pregnancies
exposed to the program three months before birth lead to higher birth weights for chil-
dren. While East (2018) studies changes in food stamp eligibility among immigrants
post-welfare reform and finds that childhood participation before age 5 improves par-
ent reported health from ages 6-16.
Despite these benefits found in the literature, some have raised concerns over the
dietary intake of SNAP participants. Gu and Tucker (2016) track dietary quality
using the Healthy Eating Index (HEI), a composite nutritional index associated with
obesity, of children and adolescents from 1999 to 2012. While the mean HEI increased
over this time period, the authors observe a downward trend in the HEI of SNAP
participants from 2004 to 2012. Among adults, Gregory and Coleman-Jensen (2013)
find that SNAP participation leads to modest changes in diet quality. Controlling
for selection into the program, the authors find that SNAP participation induces
more fruit consumption but less consumption of dark green/orange vegetables, a
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key component of the HEI. Other food categories are unchanged. Additionally, food
insecurity rates remain quite high among SNAP households as seen in Coleman-Jensen
et al. (2013) and Coleman-Jensen et al. (2018). These findings have led some to
question the adequacy of SNAP benefits to meet the nutritional needs of participants
in the program. Many of these potential shortfalls are outlined by Caswell et al.
(2013) and Ziliak (2016a). In this paper I will focus on two potential shortcomings:
the dietary needs of adolescent children and the variation in local food prices across
the country.
Maximum SNAP benefit amounts are determined by the Thrifty Food Plan (TFP),
which is the lowest cost plan that the USDA uses to outline the types and quantities
of foods that can be prepared at home to provide a diet meeting the nutritional needs
of the individuals. The reference family for the TFP is a family of four consisting
of a male and female adult, a child aged 6-8, and a child aged 11-12. The cost is
then adjusted for different family sizes to reflect economies of scale in food purchases.
There is however, no adjustment for families with differing compositions.
The maximum benefit amount is the same for a family of four with two adolescent
boys as it is for a family of four with two elementary aged children. This is despite the
fact that adolescent children need as much, and in some cases more, calorie intake
as adults do as outlined by the 2015-2020 Dietary Guidelines for Americans. For
households with multiple adolescent children, particularly single mother households
with adolescent children, this gap between the received benefit and the amount ac-
tually necessary to afford a healthful diet could have negative consequences for the
households dietary intake and the household’s food security. These households may
opt for calorically dense meals instead of healthy, balanced meals. To my knowledge,
this paper is the first to estimate the potential size of this gap and its impact on
well-being.
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Secondly, the TFP is calculated using the CPI to determine national average food
prices paid by low-income houses. This assumes that food prices do not vary across
the country, with the exception of Alaska and Hawaii. However, the literature shows
that there are sizeable regional and urban differences in food prices which can affect
the purchasing power of SNAP benefits. Waxman et al. (2018) use a unique dataset,
based on Nielsen price data, from Feeding America to calculate the average cost of
a low-income meal at the county level. Across the continental US, they find that
the average cost of a low-income meal is $2.36 which is 27 percent higher than the
SNAP maximum benefit per meal of $1.86. This average masks differences between
urban and rural counties however, with the average SNAP shortfall being 21 percent
in rural counties and 28 percent in urban counties.
Using the FoodAPS, Bronchetti et al. (2016) examine the adequacy of SNAP
taking into account the store prices where SNAP households report shopping for
food. The authors use a variety of store prices including the households primary and
secondary food store and stores within varying radii of their census block centroid.
From their sample of SNAP and SNAP–eligible households, they find that 20–30
percent of households do not have sufficient funds, SNAP benefit amount plus 30% of
net income, to purchase the TFP1. They estimate that the average dollar shortfall can
be as large as $150 per month, though this figure decreases the further they assume
households are willing to travel for groceries.
These differences in food prices can influence the dietary composition of house-
hold food purchases. Basu et al. (2016) also use the FoodAPS and observe that
households living higher area-level costs of living were associated with less healthy
food acquisitions, including significantly fewer acquisitions of vegetables, fruits, and
whole grains, and significantly greater acquisitions of refined grains, fats and oils, and
1Simulated benefits are used for SNAP–eligible households
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added sugars. Overall, living in a high-cost area was associated with an 11 percent
reduction in the Healthy Eating Index. Similar results have been shown before. Todd
et al. (2011) find that whole grains and dark-green vegetables, important components
of the TFP, were more expensive than their less healthy counterparts by 23–60 and
20–80 percent, respectively.
Insufficient SNAP benefit amounts can lead to food insecurity and a variety of neg-
ative outcomes as outlined by Gundersen and Ziliak (2015). For children, food insecu-
rity is associated with iron deficiency, lower rated health, more behavioral problems,
and worse dental hygiene. Further, Bronchetti et al. (2018) use regional variation in
food prices to test for a direct connection between SNAP purchasing power and child
health. Linking regional food prices from the Quarterly Food-at-home Price Database
to the nationally representative National Health Interview Survey, the authors find
that lower purchasing power is associated with lower utilization of preventative care
and more missed days of school due to illness. However, the authors find no effect on
the reported health status of children.
For households with adolescents, the shortfall in benefits generated by the con-
struction of the TFP and choice of reference family is potentially exacerbated by
living in an area with a high cost food. While single mothers in high cost areas with
or without adolescents may also face higher food insecurity and worse nutrition due to
individual and cultural factors. This paper seeks to estimate the impact of SNAP pur-
chasing power on dietary composition and adult food security among households with
children, by using county variation in food prices and detailed nutrition information
about households food purchases from the FoodAPS, given the adolescent adjustment




Data for this project comes from the National Household Food Acquisition and
Purchase Survey (FoodAPS). The FoodAPS is a nationally representative survey of
American households with the aim of collecting extensive information about food-at-
home (FAH) and food-away-from-home (FAFH) purchases. The survey includes data
from 4,826 households and oversampled SNAP households and low-income households
not participating in SNAP but can be weighted to be representative. The survey was
fielded between April 2012 and January 2013 and collects detailed information on
household demographics as well as income and monthly expenditure measures.
Each sampled household member over the age of 11 was asked to provided a
food-diary on food acquisitions made over a 7-day period. Households were asked
to scan barcodes on foods, save their receipts from stores and restaurants, and write
information in their food books. For food-at-home acquisitions, the scanned barcodes
were intended to be the primary source of item-level descriptions, while the receipts
were intended to provide the price or expenditure information for each item. The
FAH purchases were then matched to nutrient databases to measure the food pattern
equivalent and the caloric macro/micronutrients of each item, reported as the amount
per 100 grams. These measures form the dietary outcomes of the analysis.
Another unique feature of the FoodAPS is that it allows researchers to construct
a precise food environment for every household in the dataset. For each household,
there is rich geographic information on the distance between retail food outlets visited
and each household’s residence, as well the number and types of outlets in proximity
to each household. Given the role of food environment on food purchases and health
(Walker et al., 2010; Courtemanche and Carden, 2011; Bowen et al., 2016), I account
for households’ store access and vehicle ownership.
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Weighted descriptive statistics for the nutrition and food security outcomes as
well as relevant controls for sample of SNAP and SNAP–eligible households with
children are found in Table 4.1. Here I have defined SNAP–eligible households to be
households that are below 185% of the federal poverty line (FPL) and do not report
receiving SNAP benefits. Descriptive statistics for households with adolescents and
single mothers are shown in Tables 4.2 & 4.3, respectively. The dietary outcomes are
the household’s total amount of grains, proteins, dairy, fruits, vegetables, and added
sugars per person that the households acquired over the course of their reporting week.
Grains and proteins are measured in oz. equivalents per 100g. Fruits, vegetables, and
dairy are measured in cup equivalents per 100g, and added sugars are measured in
teaspoon equivalents per 100g. The final outcome is an indicator for if the household
is food insecure. Being food insecure is measured as having an affirmative response
to three or more items from the 10 item food security questionnaire given to each
household.2
Households acquired an average of 7.1 oz. of grain and 4.5 oz. of protein foods
per person over their reporting week. For fruits, vegetables and dairy, households
acquired an average of 1.2 cups of dairy over the week, 0.5 cups of fruit, and 1.3 cups
of vegetables. Households also acquired an average of 18.3 tsp. of added sugars per
person. Households with adolescents and single mother households acquire similar
amounts of these food groups with households with adolescents consuming slightly
less per person of each category and single mother households consuming slightly more
of each category. Food insecurity is faced by 39 percent of households with children, a
rate equivalent to what’s reported by Coleman-Jensen et al. (2013) among households
2While the full household food security module in the Current Population Survey consists of 18
questions, the FoodAPS only fielded the first 10 questions which concern adult hunger.
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with children that are under 185% of the FPL. Households with adolescents and single
mother households experienced slightly higher rates of food insecurity at 40 and 41
percent, respectively.
Tables 4.1, 4.2, & 4.3 also contain descriptive statistics for the control variables
used in the analysis. I include demographic information on the household size and
the household’s primary food shopper/meal planner including their gender, race, ed-
ucation, and marital status. In order to control for the role food access has on food
security and dietary intake, I also control for a multitude of household and geographic
characteristics. This includes if the household lives in a rural census tract, has pos-
session of a vehicle, and their census region. I also account for the geodetic distance
to the closest superstore, supermarket, combination grocery, convenience store, and
medium-large grocery store as classified by the USDA. In terms of these covariates,
the adolescent sample is similar to the whole sample while single mother households
tend to be less white and less rural. Single mother households are also closer to stores
on average, but are less likely to have their own vehicle.
4.3.2 SNAP Purchasing Power
My main independent variable for this analysis is the real purchasing power of
SNAP that each household faces. SNAP purchasing power is function of the amount
of SNAP benefits each household receives and the local food prices they face. For
households with adolescents, purchasing power is also determined by the additional
benefits needed for the teenage children to meet their dietary needs. Households
that report being on SNAP also report their monthly SNAP benefit amount. For
SNAP–eligible households, their SNAP benefits are simulated.
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The monthly SNAP benefit allotment for a household is based on the maximum
benefit as determined by the TFP, the benefit reduction rate, and the household’s
net income:
SNAP Benefit = Maximum Benefit− 0.3 ∗ Net Income. (4.1)
Households without any net income receive the maximum benefit amount for their
family size. The benefit reduction rate is 30% reflecting the assumption that house-
holds are able to contribute 30 percent of their net income toward food purchases. A
household’s net income is their gross income, minus deductions for child care, hous-
ing, and a portion of earnings. Specifically, the formula for calculating net income
is:
Net Income = Gross Income− 0.2 ∗ Earnings− Child Support
−Standard Deduction− Excess Shelter (4.2)
−Dependent Care− (Out-of-pocket Medical− 35),
where earnings refers to labor market income, child support is payments made for
children whom paternity is established, the standard deduction is a deduction received
by all households and varies with household size, dependent care includes child and
adult care expenses, the shelter deduction covers households facing high housing costs
relative to their income, and out-of-pocket medical expenses can be deducted over
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$35 for those aged 60 or older and the disabled.3 All of the necessary components to
calculate a household’s net income can be found in the FoodAPS, with the exception
of the presence of a disabled person in the household.4
Using equations (4.1) and (4.2), I simulate SNAP benefits for SNAP–eligible
households. As a test of the simulation, I also simulate SNAP benefits for SNAP
households and compare them to the household’s self reported benefit amount. Given
the statutory definition of benefit levels, these two measures should be identical with
perfect reporting. On average the estimate is within a few dollars of the reported
amount, giving me confidence in the simulation. There are, however, some cases of
large under and over estimating which I attribute to measurement error given the
near equal likelihood of each case.
The next component of SNAP purchasing power is the adjustment to benefits for
households with adolescents, given their increased dietary needs. To calculate this
adjustment, I alter the maximum SNAP benefit available for the family according to
the number and gender of adolescents in their household. Recall that the maximum
SNAP benefit is derived from the TFP for a reference family of 4 people containing
a 19-50 male and female adult, one child aged 6-8, and a child aged 9-11. The TFP
estimates each of their monthly food costs and the maximum benefit for a family of
four is the sum of these food costs. The maximum SNAP benefit per person is also
derived from this amount by dividing the sum by four. This per person amount is
what is used for families of different sizes along with an economies of scale adjustment,
regardless of the family’s composition.
3Further details about the net income determination can be found at the USDA FNS website at
https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/recipient/eligibility
4I am grateful to Kameron Burt & Bob Dalrymple at USDA FNS and Michele Ver Ploeg at USDA
ERS for providing the standard utility allowance amounts for FY 2012, necessary to accurately
calculate the excess shelter deduction.
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In 2012, the maximum benefit for a family of four was $668 and the per person
benefit was $167. Note, this differs from the reported TFP food costs for 2012 because
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) uniformly increased benefit
levels. The ARRA mandated that the maximum monthly benefit levels would remain
13.6% higher than their March 2009 levels until November 2013, when the ARRA
expired (Valizadeh and Smith, 2019). For households of smaller or larger sizes than
four, an economies of scale adjustment is made to the per person benefit to obtain
the maximum benefit. The economies of scale adjustments that are used and the
resulting maximum benefits are shown in Table 4.4.
Although family composition, beyond the selection of the reference family, is not
a factor in calculating SNAP benefits, the monthly food cost under the TFP is also
calculated for different age-gender groups. For families with adolescents, I use the
TFP cost for the child’s age-gender group in place of the per person amount allocated
to them. This provides an estimate of how much more in benefits the family needs to
provide the adolescents with a nutritious diet according to the TFP. Under the TFP,
in 2012 a male aged 12-13 had a monthly food cost of $173.81, a male aged 14-18
had a monthly food cost of $180.51, a female aged 12-13 had a monthly food cost of
$174.26, and a female aged 14-18 had a monthly food cost of $172.33. All of which
exceed the maximum $167 per person they would be allocated in SNAP benefits.
Table 4.5 shows the resulting monthly benefit and the net increase in benefit each
additional adolescent would bring to a household of each size, taking economies of
scale into account. The table shows that if a family of 3 that includes a 15 year old
boy were to get the TFP allotment for the adolescent instead of the base per person
benefit, they would receive $189.54 in benefits for the boy instead of $175.35. This
is an increase of $14.19 a month. If a family of 5 included a 12 year old boy and a
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16 year old girl, their benefits would increase by $6.47 + $5.06 = $11.53 a month.
For households with multiple adolescents, particularly teenage boys, this shortfall in
needed benefits can reach a sizable portion of their monthly benefit.
Local food prices are the final component of SNAP purchasing power. A strength
of the FoodAPS compared to other datasets, such as the Quarterly Food-At-Home
Price Database, is that households can be linked to very fine levels of geographic
food prices, including county level store prices. County level store-week prices were
constructed by the teams at the University of Illinois and the University of Florida
from IRI scanner data. The team created a TFP basket cost for a family of four for
each store-week in the IRI data by finding the median price-per-pound for each TFP
category, multiplying that price by the quantity (in pound equivalents) recommended
by the TFP, and then summing across the categories for a final basket price. To get
an accurate estimation of each household’s local food environment, I assign each
household a county level TFP cost based on the median basket price of every store-
week in their county. This measure is also converted to a monthly cost and is adjusted
for family size using the same economies of scale adjustments that the SNAP benefit
calculation uses. I will refer to this measure as the county TFP basket price.
However, the county TFP basket price is a potentially flawed measure because
prices are calculated using all items in a TFP category, including high price food
items, and may not be representative of the actual spending habits of SNAP and
SNAP–eligible households. To address this, the team created another price measure
that calculates the median price-per-pound using only the lowest quintile of prices
for the TFP category. I will refer to this measure as the county low-cost TFP basket
price. Each basket measure has its advantages and drawbacks but to better match
the existing literature on SNAP purchasing power, such as Bronchetti et al. (2018), I
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will use the county TFP basket price in the baseline analysis and the county low-cost
TFP basket price as a robustness check to ensure that the results are not being driven
by basket choice.
I measure the purchasing power of SNAP using the ratio of SNAP benefits plus
30 percent of net income minus the adolescent adjustment to the county level TFP
basket price faced by the household:
Ratio = SNAP Benefit + 0.3 ∗ Net Income− Teen AdjustmentCounty TFP Basket Price . (4.3)
The household’s SNAP benefit plus 30 percent of net income is the assumed amount
households should spend on food, as seen in equation (4.1). The adjustment for ado-
lescents is subtracted from expected food expenditures to represent the additional
purchasing power needed to provide adolescents with a healthy diet. In the robust-
ness checks the county low-cost basket price is used instead. A ratio greater than 1
indicates that the household’s expected food expenditures are greater than the actual
cost of the TFP, while a ratio less than 1 indicates that the TFP exceeds what house-
holds are expected to spend on food. In the regression analysis, I use the natural log
of this ratio as the key independent variable for ease of interpretation.
Table 4.6 provides survey weighted summary statistics for the relevant SNAP pur-
chasing power measurements. Table 4.6 shows the descriptive statistics for the entire
sample and the descriptive statistics for households with adolescents and single mother
households. The average reported and simulated monthly SNAP benefit amount is
$311 and is slightly higher for households with adolescents and single mother house-
holds. The average expected monthly food expenditure, SNAP benefit plus 30% of
net income, is $776. Expected expenditures are slightly larger for households with
adolescents at $805 and are smaller for single mother households at $709.
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The purchasing power of the household’s food expenditure is also determined by
the adjustment for adolescents and their local food prices. For households with ado-
lescents, the average adjustment needed to provide the teens with a nutritious diet
according to the TFP is $12.5, as seen in Table 4.6. This would represent a 4 per-
cent increase to the average SNAP benefit amount, or about one-third the percentage
increase implemented by the ARRA. The estimated local cost of the TFP can vary
dramatically based on the assumptions of the shopping habits of low-income house-
holds. Using median price-per-pound measures, the average monthly cost of the TFP
adjust for family size is $1206 which exceeds the average estimated food expendi-
tures of $776, suggesting the SNAP benefits are not sufficient once one accounts for
local food prices. However, if low-income households regularly buy the cheaper food
available, expected food expenditures exceed the estimated cost of the TFP using the
lowest quintile of prices at $632.
4.3.3 Empirical Model
I estimate the impact of variation in SNAP purchasing power, given the dietary
needs of adolescents and local food prices, on the dietary quality of household’s food
acquisitions and food security. The sample includes SNAP and SNAP–eligible house-
holds with children, with special attention given to households with adolescents and
single mother households. The regressions take the following form:
yirt = α + βln(Ratioi) + γSNAPi +Xiθ + λr + δt + ui, (4.4)
where yirt is the nutrition measure or food security outcome for household i living
in census region r and completed their food diary in month t. The key independent
variable is the natural log of the ratio of the household’s expected food expenditure
minus any necessary benefit adjustment for adolescents to the county TFP price as
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outlined in equation (4.3). SNAPi is a binary indicator for if the household is a
SNAP household vs SNAP–eligible, to account for any consumption differences the
two groups may have. Xi is a vector of demographic characteristics and food access
measures. Census region fixed effects and survey month fixed effects are also included
and are represented by λr and δt, respectively. All standard errors are clustered at
the county level.
4.4 Results
I first present results using the average price-per-pound TFP basket cost. Table
4.7 shows the regression results for the whole sample. For ease of interpretation,
Table 4.7 and each subsequent table will also show the effect of a 10% increase in
purchasing power and the resulting change as a percent of baseline consumption.
An increase in purchasing power is associated with an increase in amount of food
acquired in every food category, though not always at a statistically significant level.
A ten percent increase in purchasing power is associated with households acquiring
0.108 more ounces of grains per person per week and 0.095 more ounces of proteins,
a 1.5 and 2.1 percent increase from baseline, respectively. A ten percent increase in
purchasing power also increase acquisitions of dairy and vegetables at a statistically
significant level, increasing acquisitions of dairy by 2.5 percent and vegetables by 1.6
percent. The effect on fruit is also positive but not statistically significant at any
traditional level.
In tandem with the acquisition of more grains, vegetables, and other food cat-
egories, households also increase their consumption of added sugars as purchasing
power increases. A ten percent increase in purchasing power is associated with a 0.32
more teaspoons of added sugar a week per person, a 1.7 percent increase from base-
line. Compared to SNAP–eligible households, households that report participating
in SNAP report greater quantities of grains, proteins, dairy, and added sugars per
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person. These households also acquire less fruits and more vegetables but the differ-
ence is not statistically significant. More purchasing power also leads to a modest
decline in the likelihood that a household is food insecure, with a 10 percent increase
in power decreasing the likelihood by one percent at a statistically insignificant level.
Table 4.8 reports the results for households with adolescents and Table 4.9 con-
tains the results for the sample of single mother households. The results here are
qualitatively similar to those in Table 4.7, though they are estimated less precisely
due to the smaller sample size. For households with adolescents, a ten percent increase
in purchasing power is associated with higher quantities of all food groups, though is
only statistically significant for vegetables and added sugars. A ten percent increase
in purchasing power is associated with a 2.5 percent increase in the vegetables and
a 2.9 percent increase in added sugars. A ten percent increase in purchasing power
for single mother households has an estimated effect very close to that of the whole
sample, as seen in Table 4.9. A ten percent increase in purchasing power increases
the quantity of grains by 1.9 percent, proteins by 2.5 percent, dairy by 1.7 percent,
and added sugars by 2.3 percent, all at a statistically significant level. Across the
major food groups, the results imply an elasticity of approximately 0.2 in magnitude,
suggesting the demand for these goods to be quite inelastic.
As in the whole sample, an increase in purchasing power leads to a reduction in
the likelihood of being food insecure for households with adolescents but not at a
significant level. Strangely, the effect is positive for single mother households, though
again the effect is not statistically different from zero. SNAP households with ado-
lescents and single mother SNAP households also generally acquire larger quantities
of each food type relative to their SNAP–eligible counterparts. The results in Tables
4.8 & 4.9 suggests that the food purchasing decisions of households with adolescents
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and single mother households are largely similar to those of other households with
children despite the increased dietary needs of adolescents and the gender dynamics
for the single mother households.
To test that the results are not being driven by the assumptions on the purchasing
habits of low income households, I also run the model in equation (4.4) using the low
cost TFP basket price to construct the ratio from equation (4.3). These results are
shown in Tables 4.10, 4.11, & 4.12. Across each of the samples, the results when using
the low cost TFP basket are very similar to the baseline specifications showing that
the findings are robust to the choice of basket price, though they tend to be slightly
smaller and less precisely estimated. An increase in purchasing power is associated
with an increase in the consumption of all food groups for the sample of all households.
For all households, a ten percent increase in purchasing power increases the quantity
of grains by 1.5 percent, proteins and dairy by 2.3 percent, and vegetables by 1.5
percent, all at a statistically significant level. Households with adolescents and single
mother households have similar food purchasing patterns as seen in Tables 4.11 &
4.12 compared to the results in Tables 4.8 & 4.9. Although the coefficient are slightly
larger in magnitude, there is still not a statistically significant effect of purchasing
power on food insecurity.
It is helpful to put the results presented here into context compared to their
recommended daily allotment. While the effects presented here tend to be statisti-
cally significant, as seen by the modest percent increases, they aren’t very large in
magnitude. For example, in the whole sample, the predicted increase in vegetable
acquisitions is 0.022 cups of vegetables per person per week. For children over the
age of nine, the recommended amount of vegetables is at least 2 cups a day. Assum-
ing all food acquired in a week is consumed that week and is split evenly amongst
the household, this increase is minimal compared to what is needed for a healthy
diet. The effect on unhealthy foods that contain added sugars is equally modest. The
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predicted increase in added sugars from a 10 percent increase is 0.32 teaspoons per
person per week which translates to about 1.28 grams of sugar. This is well below
the amount of sugar one would find in any sugar sweetened beverage.
Our estimated elasticity of approximately 0.2 is also smaller than what other
studies have found. Studying the impact of the USDA FNS led Healthy Incentives
Pilot, Klerman et al. (2014) find that a 30 percent reduction in the price of fruits
and vegetables increased their consumption by 20 percent, an implied elasticity of
approximately 0.66 in magnitude. Estimating a demand system with a Bayesian
procedure, Lin et al. (2014) also find elasticities of 0.6–0.8 in magnitude across several
food groups, including the ones studied in this paper.
These relative small changes in acquisition amounts may suggest that households
are acquiring more “high quality” foods, such as those that are low in sodium or
saturated fats, rather than simply more of the same food. Another possibility is
that households are buying healthier varieties of food such as whole grains instead of
refined and dark green vegetables instead of starchy ones. This shift towards higher
quality could also explain why a ten percent increase does not lead to a decline in rates
of food insecurity at a significant level, though the estimated effect is still negative.
The results presented here are similar to Gregory and Coleman-Jensen (2013) who
found that the benefits gained from participation have at best a modest effect on
dietary quality. If going from no benefits to full benefits doesn’t induce much change,
it seems unlikely that a ten percent increase in real benefits would have much effect
either.
4.5 Conclusion
The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program is a critical component of the
social safety net, particularly for low income households with children. However,
given food insecurity rates remain high among participants, there is concern that the
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benefits are not sufficient to provide all households with a healthy, nutritious diet.
This is especially true for households with adolescents and single mother households.
Here I focus on two potential shortfalls of SNAP benefits: the lack of a benefit
adjustment for family composition and no adjustment for local food prices. I explore
the effects of an increase to household’s SNAP purchasing power on dietary intake
and food insecurity.
For the analysis, I use the Food Acquisition and Purchase Survey, a rich dataset
that contains thorough information on household food acquisitions, local food envi-
ronment, and household demographics. I construct a measure food purchasing power
for SNAP and SNAP–eligible households with children by calculating the ratio be-
tween expected food expenditures and local food prices, taking into account any
necessary adjustments for adolescents. I find that an increase in purchasing power
is associated with an increase in the acquisition of nearly every major food group. I
find that, for the full sample, a ten percent increase in purchasing power is associated
with increased per person weekly acquisition of grains, proteins, dairy, and vegetables
by 1.5-2.5 percent. The quantity of added sugars also increases by approximately two
percent. The magnitudes and the resulting percent changes are similar when I sep-
arate the sample into households with adolescents and the sample of single mother
households. A ten percent increase in purchasing power also reduces the likelihood of
being food insecure by 1 percent, though not at a statistically significant level. The
results are robust to an alternative specification of local food prices that uses the
lowest quintile of prices instead of the average.
Though I find positive effects of purchasing power on the acquisition of all foods,
the magnitudes are fairly modest. The implied weekly increase per person is a fraction
of the daily requirement recommended for a healthy diet. The relatively small changes
in the total quantities of each food may be masking substitution within each group.
Households may use the increase in purchasing power to acquire higher quality foods
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in each category such as more whole grains or dark leafy green vegetables or foods
with less sodium or saturated fats. However, it may also be the case that household
diet is relatively fixed for these demographics of people. Gregory and Coleman-Jensen
(2013) find that when individuals participate in SNAP, the new benefits have at best a
modest effect on dietary quality, similar to what I have shown here. Further research
is needed to explore the relationship between SNAP benefit amounts and dietary
acquisitions as well as any interaction benefit levels may have with food access, local
food environments, and nutrition education.
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Tables




Grain per Person (oz.) 7.14 7.75 1217
Meat, Soy, Nuts per Person(oz.) 4.57 5.77 1217
Dairy per Person (cup) 1.18 1.43 1217
Fruit per Person (cup) 0.59 0.96 1217
Vegetables per Person (cup) 1.38 1.70 1217
Added Sugar per Person (tsp.) 18.37 23.69 1217
Food Insecure 0.39 0.49 1217
Demographics
SNAP Household 0.56 0.50 1217
Have an Adolescent 0.47 0.50 1217
Household Size 4.27 1.65 1217
White 0.61 0.49 1217
Black 0.24 0.43 1217
Hispanic 0.11 0.32 1217
Less than HS Edu 0.27 0.44 1217
HS Degree 0.27 0.45 1217
Some College Edu. 0.36 0.48 1217
College Degree 0.08 0.27 1217
Postgraduate 0.01 0.10 1217
Married 0.42 0.49 1217
Single Mother 0.50 0.50 1217
Access
Rural 0.25 0.43 1217
Has Vehicle 0.82 0.38 1217
Distance to Superstore 2.52 3.56 1217
Distance to Supermarket 2.55 4.60 1217
Distance to Combination Grocery 1.44 2.36 1217
Distance to Convenience Store 1.17 2.08 1217
Distance to Medium, Large Grocery 3.88 5.35 1217
Northeast Region 0.09 0.29 1217
Midwest Region 0.27 0.45 1217
South Region 0.42 0.49 1217
West Region 0.21 0.41 1217
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Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics - Households With Adolescents
Mean SD Observations
Outcomes
Grain per Person (oz.) 6.99 7.78 579
Meat, Soy, Nuts per Person(oz.) 4.32 5.06 579
Dairy per Person (cup) 1.09 1.32 579
Fruit per Person (cup) 0.51 0.65 579
Vegetables per Person (cup) 1.32 1.52 579
Added Sugar per Person (tsp.) 17.29 25.37 579
Food Insecure 0.40 0.49 579
Demographics
SNAP Household 0.47 0.50 579
Household Size 4.58 1.74 579
White 0.64 0.48 579
Black 0.22 0.41 579
Hispanic 0.10 0.30 579
Less than HS Edu 0.26 0.44 579
HS Degree 0.30 0.46 579
Some College Edu. 0.33 0.47 579
College Degree 0.10 0.30 579
Postgraduate 0.01 0.12 579
Married 0.50 0.50 579
Single Mother 0.43 0.50 579
Access
Rural 0.28 0.45 579
Has Vehicle 0.85 0.35 579
Distance to Superstore 2.79 3.76 579
Distance to Supermarket 2.69 4.85 579
Distance to Combination Grocery 1.66 2.79 579
Distance to Convenience Store 1.33 2.44 579
Distance to Medium, Large Grocery 3.98 5.21 579
Northeast Region 0.09 0.29 579
Midwest Region 0.27 0.44 579
South Region 0.39 0.49 579
West Region 0.26 0.44 579
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Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics - Single Mother Households
Mean SD Observations
Outcomes
Grain per Person (oz.) 7.69 8.64 619
Meat, Soy, Nuts per Person(oz.) 4.99 6.87 619
Dairy per Person (cup) 1.27 1.53 619
Fruit per Person (cup) 0.57 0.82 619
Vegetables per Person (cup) 1.41 1.66 619
Added Sugar per Person (tsp.) 21.53 28.63 619
Food Insecure 0.41 0.49 619
Demographics
SNAP Household 0.73 0.44 619
Adolescent 0.41 0.49 619
Household Size 3.83 1.55 619
White 0.53 0.50 619
Black 0.34 0.47 619
Hispanic 0.08 0.28 619
Less than HS Edu 0.27 0.44 619
HS Degree 0.27 0.44 619
Some College Edu. 0.39 0.49 619
College Degree 0.06 0.24 619
Postgraduate 0.01 0.10 619
Access
Rural 0.20 0.40 619
Has Vehicle 0.74 0.44 619
Distance to Superstore 2.22 3.40 619
Distance to Supermarket 2.18 3.92 619
Distance to Combination Grocery 1.09 1.56 619
Distance to Convenience Store 0.85 1.39 619
Distance to Medium, Large Grocery 3.63 5.37 619
Northeast Region 0.09 0.29 619
Midwest Region 0.27 0.44 619
South Region 0.46 0.50 619
West Region 0.19 0.39 619
107
Table 4.4: SNAP Maximum Benefits FY2012
HH Size Economies of Scale Benefit Per Person Maximum Benefit
1 1.2 200.4 200.4
2 1.1 183.7 367.4
3 1.05 175.35 526.1
4 1 167 668
5 0.95 158.65 793.3
6 0.95 158.65 951.9
7 (or more) 0.9 150.3 1052.1
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Table 4.5: SNAP Benefit Increases for Adolescents
12-13 Male 14-18 Male 12-13 Female 14-18 Female




















1 1.2 208.57 8.17 216.61 16.21 209.11 8.71 206.8 6.40
2 1.1 191.19 7.49 198.56 14.86 191.69 7.99 189.56 5.86
3 1.05 182.5 7.15 189.54 14.19 182.97 7.62 180.95 5.60
4 1 173.81 6.81 180.51 13.51 174.26 7.26 172.33 5.33
5 or 6 0.95 165.12 6.47 171.48 12.83 165.55 6.90 163.71 5.06
7 (or more) 0.9 156.43 6.13 162.46 12.16 156.83 6.53 155.1 4.80
Table 4.6: SNAP Purchasing Power Statistics
Whole Sample Adolescent HH Single Mothers
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Monthly SNAP Benefit 311 235 313 263 329 208
Monthly Food Expenditure 776 685 805 713 709 829
County TFP Basket Price 1207 436 1276 451 1095 419
County Low Cost TFP Basket Price 633 209 663 215 577 198
Teen Adjustment for SNAP 5.89 7.90 12.54 7.03 5.10 7.73
Food Spending to TFP Basket Price Ratio 0.71 0.75 0.72 0.86 0.71 0.75
Food Spending to Low Cost TFP Basket Price Ratio 1.33 1.40 1.38 1.67 1.31 1.34
Observations 1217 579 619
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Table 4.7: SNAP Purchasing Power & Nutrition
Grains Proteins Dairy Fruits Vegetables Added Sugar Food Insecure
log(ratio) 1.080** 0.946** 0.285*** 0.009 0.222** 3.198* -0.027
(0.526) (0.426) (0.102) (0.065) (0.104) (1.809) (0.036)
SNAP HH 1.280* 1.286*** 0.360*** -0.038 0.053 4.455** -0.018
(0.653) (0.391) (0.117) (0.124) (0.178) (1.834) (0.042)
Outcome Mean 7.14 4.57 1.18 0.59 1.38 18.37 0.39
10% Increase in SNAP Purchasing Power 0.108 0.095 0.029 0.001 0.022 0.320 -0.003
As a % of Outcome Mean 1.5% 2.1% 2.5% 0.2% 1.6% 1.7% -0.8%
Obs. 1,217 1,217 1,217 1,217 1,217 1,217 1,217
Results from weighted OLS regressions. Standard errors clustered at the county level; * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Controls
include household size, urban residency, automobile ownership, store distances, primary shopper gender, race, education, and marital
status. All models include region fixed effects and survey month fixed effects.
Table 4.8: SNAP Purchasing Power & Nutrition - Adolescents
Grains Proteins Dairy Fruits Vegetables Added Sugar Food Insecure
log(ratio) 1.281 0.521 0.320 0.106 0.332** 4.997* -0.044
(0.869) (0.451) (0.205) (0.084) (0.162) (2.718) (0.054)
SNAP HH 2.273** 1.675** 0.393** 0.099 0.185 6.418** -0.065
(1.099) (0.657) (0.175) (0.078) (0.207) (2.669) (0.050)
Outcome Mean 6.99 4.32 1.09 0.51 1.32 17.29 0.40
10% Increase in SNAP Purchasing Power 0.128 0.052 0.032 0.011 0.033 0.500 -0.004
As a % of Outcome Mean 1.8% 1.2% 2.9% 2.2% 2.5% 2.9% -1.0%
Obs. 579 579 579 579 579 579 579
Results from weighted OLS regressions. Standard errors clustered at the county level; * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Controls include household size, urban residency, automobile ownership, store distances, primary shopper gender, race, education,
and marital status. All models include region fixed effects and survey month fixed effects.
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Table 4.9: SNAP Purchasing Power & Nutrition - Single Mothers
Grains Proteins Dairy Fruits Vegetables Added Sugar Food Insecure
log(ratio) 1.478** 1.259** 0.224** -0.047 0.192 4.998** 0.034
(0.665) (0.600) (0.110) (0.075) (0.123) (2.031) (0.047)
SNAP HH 1.338 1.360** 0.448** 0.089 -0.014 6.872* -0.060
(1.058) (0.626) (0.182) (0.119) (0.224) (3.558) (0.056)
Outcome Mean 7.69 4.99 1.27 0.57 1.41 21.53 0.41
10% Increase in SNAP Purchasing Power 0.148 0.126 0.022 -0.005 0.019 0.500 0.003
As a % of Outcome Mean 1.9% 2.5% 1.7% -0.9% 1.3% 2.3% 0.7%
Obs. 619 619 619 619 619 619 619
Results from weighted OLS regressions. Standard errors clustered at the county level; * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Controls include household size, urban residency, automobile ownership, store distances, primary shopper race and education. All
models include region fixed effects and survey month fixed effects.
Table 4.10: Low Cost Basket SNAP Purchasing Power & Nutrition
Grains Proteins Dairy Fruits Vegetables Added Sugar Food Insecure
log(ratio_low) 1.071* 1.033** 0.266** 0.031 0.207* 2.811 -0.031
(0.548) (0.461) (0.109) (0.069) (0.110) (1.855) (0.037)
SNAP HH 1.289* 1.299*** 0.362*** -0.037 0.054 4.466** -0.018
(0.656) (0.392) (0.117) (0.124) (0.179) (1.852) (0.042)
Outcome Mean 7.14 4.57 1.18 0.59 1.38 18.37 0.39
10% Increase in SNAP Purchasing Power 0.107 0.103 0.027 0.003 0.021 0.281 -0.003
As a % of Outcome Mean 1.5% 2.3% 2.3% 0.5% 1.5% 1.5% -0.8%
Obs. 1,217 1,217 1,217 1,217 1,217 1,217 1,217
Results from weighted OLS regressions. Standard errors clustered at the county level; * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Controls include household size, urban residency, automobile ownership, store distances, primary shopper gender, race, education,
and marital status. All models include region fixed effects and survey month fixed effects.
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Table 4.11: Low Cost Basket SNAP Purchasing Power & Nutrition - Adolescents
Grains Proteins Dairy Fruits Vegetables Added Sugar Food Insecure
log(ratio_low) 1.215 0.535 0.275 0.120 0.324* 4.443 -0.047
(0.909) (0.472) (0.222) (0.091) (0.165) (2.815) (0.056)
SNAP HH 2.291** 1.684** 0.396** 0.102 0.190 6.468** -0.066
(1.108) (0.659) (0.179) (0.078) (0.208) (2.721) (0.050)
Outcome Mean 6.99 4.32 1.09 0.51 1.32 17.29 0.40
10% Increase in SNAP Purchasing Power 0.122 0.054 0.028 0.012 0.032 0.444 -0.005
As a % of Outcome Mean 1.7% 1.3% 2.6% 2.4% 2.4% 2.6% -1.3%
Obs. 579 579 579 579 579 579 579
Results from weighted OLS regressions. Standard errors clustered at the county level; * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Controls include household size, urban residency, automobile ownership, store distances, primary shopper gender, race, education,
and marital status. All models include region fixed effects and survey month fixed effects.
Table 4.12: Low Cost Basket SNAP Purchasing Power & Nutrition - Single Mothers
Grains Proteins Dairy Fruits Vegetables Added Sugar Food Insecure
log(ratio_low) 1.252* 1.290** 0.207* -0.031 0.167 4.329** 0.034
(0.652) (0.641) (0.118) (0.077) (0.128) (1.992) (0.049)
SNAP HH 1.348 1.376** 0.450** 0.089 -0.013 6.910* -0.060
(1.063) (0.627) (0.181) (0.120) (0.225) (3.563) (0.056)
Outcome Mean 7.69 4.99 1.27 0.57 1.41 21.53 0.41
10% Increase in SNAP Purchasing Power 0.125 0.129 0.021 -0.003 0.017 0.433 0.003
As a % of Outcome Mean 1.6% 2.6% 1.7% -0.5% 1.2% 2.0% 0.7%
Obs. 619 619 619 619 619 619 619
Results from weighted OLS regressions. Standard errors clustered at the county level; * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Controls include household size, urban residency, automobile ownership, store distances, primary shopper race and education. All




Table A.1: Description of Woodcock-Johnson-R Subtests
Subscale Description
Letter-Word Identification Tests for symbolic learning (matching pictures with words) as well
as reading identification skills (identifying letters and words).
Applied Problems Measures skill in analyzing solving practical problems in mathe-
matics
Passage Comprehension Measures comprehension and vocabulary skills using multiple-
choice and fill-in-the-blank format
Table A.2: Behavior Problems Index Factors and Reliabilities
For the next set of statements, decide whether they are not true, sometimes
true, or often true, of (CHILD)s behavior.
External Internal Total
(He/She) has sudden changes in mood or feeling X X
(He/She feels or complains that no one loves him/her X X
(He/She) is rather high strung and nervous X X
(He/She) cheats or tells lies X X
(He/She) is too fearful or anxious X X
(He/She) argues too much X X
(He/She) his difficulty concentrating, cannot pay attention for long X X
(He/She) is easily confused, seems to be in a fog X X
(He/She) bullies or is cruel or mean to others X X
(He/She) is disobedient X X
(He/She) does not seem to feel sorry after (he/she misbehaves) X X
(He/She) has trouble getting along with other children X X X
(He/She) is impulsive, or acts without thinking X X
(He/She) feels worthless or inferior X X
(He/She) is not liked by other children X X
(He/She) has difficulty getting (his/her) mind off certain thoughts X X
(He/She) is restless or overly active, cannot sit still X X
(He/She) is stubborn, sullen, or irritable X X
(He/She) has a very strong temper and loses it easily X X
(He/She) is unhappy, sad, or depressed X X
(He/She) is withdrawn, does not get involved with others X X
(He/She) breaks things on purpose or deliberately destroys things X X
(He/She) clings to adults * * X
(He/She) cries too much X X
(He/She) demands a lot of attention X X
(He/She) is too dependant on others X X
(He/She) feels others are out to get (him/her) X X
(He/She) hands around with kids who get into trouble * * X
(He/She) is secretive, keeps things to (himself/herself) X X
(He/She) worries too much X X
Number of Items 16 13 30
Cronbach’s alpha 0.86 0.81 0.9
Source: Hofferth et al. (1997)
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Table A.3: Child Care Use - Boys
Childcare Use Informal Care Formal Care
Welfare Treatment (β) 0.115 0.059 0.072*
(0.075) (0.072) (0.038)
Welfare Exposure (γ) -0.042 -0.052 0.006
(0.051) (0.052) (0.033)
At-Risk (δ) 0.011 0.029 -0.013
(0.021) (0.020) (0.019)
Outcome Mean 0.20 0.15 0.06
Percent Change 58.00 39.29 110.84
Treatment at Mean Wisb 0.034 0.017 0.021
Perc. Change at Mean 17.06 11.55 32.60
Obs. 3,142 3,142 3,142
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level, * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Controls
include child race, number of siblings, child age, mother’s age, mother education, birth weight,
if breastfed, if raised by grandparent, urban residency, state unemployment rate, state minimum
wage, state EITC, maximum TANF benefit for 2,3,4 person families. State, interview year, and
birth-year fixed effects included.
Table A.4: Child Care Use - Girls
Childcare Use Informal Care Formal Care
Welfare Treatment (β) 0.071 -0.006 0.053*
(0.069) (0.063) (0.026)
Welfare Exposure (γ) 0.021 0.017 0.008
(0.036) (0.042) (0.028)
At-Risk (δ) 0.010 0.035* -0.027
(0.026) (0.020) (0.019)
Outcome Mean 0.22 0.16 0.08
Percent Change 32.35 -3.89 68.20
Treatment at Mean Wisb 0.021 -0.002 0.016
Perc. Change at Mean 9.73 -1.17 20.50
Obs. 3,067 3,067 3,067
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level, * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Controls
include child race, number of siblings, child age, mother’s age, mother education, birth weight,
if breastfed, if raised by grandparent, urban residency, state unemployment rate, state minimum
wage, state EITC, maximum TANF benefit for 2,3,4 person families. State, interview year, and
birth-year fixed effects included.
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Table A.5: Childhood Human Capital Family Fixed Effects - Nonmovers
Letter Word Passage Comp. Applied Problems BPI
Welfare Treatment (β) 6.805* 3.713 2.655 -1.086
(4.040) (3.258) (2.218) (1.108)
Welfare Exposure (γ) -4.927* 0.668 -3.656 -0.254
(2.456) (4.558) (3.826) (1.021)
Outcome SD 18.15 16.90 16.10 6.37
Percent Change 37.49 21.96 16.49 -17.06
Treatment at Mean Wisb 1.979 1.080 0.772 -0.316
Perc. Change at Mean 10.91 6.39 4.80 -4.96
Obs. 2,793 2,475 2,782 3,087
Sibling Pairs 716 709 716 736
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level, * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Controls include child gender, child race, number of siblings, child age, mother’s age, birth
weight, if breastfed, urban residency, state unemployment rate, state minimum wage, state
EITC, maximum TANF benefit for 2,3,4 person families. State, interview year, and birth-
year fixed effects included.
Table A.6: Adulthood Human Capital Family Fixed Effects - Nonmovers
Attend College College Degree Married Single Parent
Welfare Treatment (β) 0.015 0.202** 0.075 0.051
(0.135) (0.086) (0.053) (0.078)
Welfare Exposure (γ) -0.086 -0.231*** -0.110 -0.114
(0.095) (0.078) (0.068) (0.107)
Sample Mean 0.72 0.28 0.10 0.14
Percent Change 2.04 72.21 73.47 35.62
Treatment at Mean Wisb 0.003 0.035 0.013 0.009
Perc. Change at Mean 0.35 12.44 12.66 6.14
Obs. 3,544 2,470 3,586 3,584
Sibling Pairs 673 625 674 674
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level, * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Controls include gender, race, age, birth weight, if breastfed, state unemployment rate,
state minimum wage. State, interview year, and birth-year fixed effects included.
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Table A.7: Childhood Human Capital Family Fixed Effects - Time Trend
Letter Word Passage Comp. Applied Problems BPI
Welfare Treatment (β) 7.396* 3.341 2.318 -1.496
(3.746) (2.871) (2.285) (1.074)
Welfare Exposure (γ) -6.482** -1.052 -5.104 0.634
(2.511) (4.906) (3.955) (1.188)
Outcome SD 18.11 16.78 16.12 6.37
Percent Change 40.84 19.92 14.39 -23.47
Treatment at Mean Wisb 2.158 0.975 0.676 -0.436
Perc. Change at Mean 11.92 5.81 4.20 -6.85
Obs. 3,063 2,705 3,050 3,414
Sibling Pairs 786 777 786 813
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level, * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Controls include child gender, child race, number of siblings, child age, mother’s age, birth
weight, if breastfed, urban residency, state unemployment rate, state minimum wage, state
EITC, maximum TANF benefit for 2,3,4 person families. State, interview year, and birth-
year fixed effects included.
Table A.8: Adulthood Human Capital Family Fixed Effects -Time Trends
Attend College College Degree Married Single Parent
Welfare Treatment (β) 0.059 0.224** 0.055 -0.058
(0.139) (0.095) (0.055) (0.094)
Welfare Exposure (γ) -0.068 -0.218* -0.085 -0.054
(0.109) (0.126) (0.070) (0.100)
Sample Mean 0.73 0.28 0.10 0.14
Percent Change 8.06 79.32 53.16 -41.12
Treatment at Mean Wisb 0.010 0.039 0.010 -0.010
Perc. Change at Mean 1.40 13.81 9.25 -7.16
Obs. 3,878 2,689 3,921 3,919
Sibling Pairs 733 680 734 734
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level, * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Controls include gender, race, age, birth weight, if breastfed, state unemployment rate,
state minimum wage. State, interview year, and birth-year fixed effects included.
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Table A.9: Childhood Letter Word Reading Score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Welfare Treatment (β) 3.597** 4.095*** 4.227*** 4.340*** 4.305***
(1.500) (1.287) (1.169) (1.128) (1.122)
Welfare Exposure (γ) -1.253 -1.588 -0.901 -1.195 -1.368
(2.017) (2.099) (2.046) (2.012) (1.991)
At-Risk (δ) -9.033*** -6.498*** -3.839*** -3.715*** -3.732***
(0.815) (0.659) (0.655) (0.697) (0.695)
Child/HH Controls NO YES YES YES YES
Mother Controls NO NO YES YES YES
Early Health NO NO NO YES YES
State Controls NO NO NO NO YES
Obs. 4,884 4,884 4,884 4,884 4,884
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level, * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p
<0.01. Child/HH Controls: child gender, child race, number of siblings, child age,
if raised by grandparent, and urban residency. Mother’s Controls: mother’s age and
mother education. Early Health: birth weight and if breastfed. State Controls: state
unemployment rate, state minimum wage, state EITC, maximum TANF benefit for
2,3,4 person families. State, interview year, and birth-year fixed effects included in
all specification.
Table A.10: Adulthood College Completion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Welfare Treatment (β) 0.110*** 0.125*** 0.145*** 0.144*** 0.146***
(0.038) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
Welfare Exposure (γ) 0.048 0.049 0.041 0.040 0.040
(0.049) (0.046) (0.042) (0.041) (0.042)
At-Risk (δ) -0.143*** -0.115*** -0.042* -0.039* -0.039*
(0.018) (0.020) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Demographics NO YES YES YES YES
Mother Controls NO NO YES YES YES
Early Health NO NO NO YES YES
State Controls NO NO NO NO YES
Obs. 4,397 4,397 4,397 4,397 4,397
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level, * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, ***
p <0.01. Demographics: gender, race, number of siblings, age, and if raised by
grandparent. Mom Controls: mother’s education. Early Controls: birth weight and
if breastfed. State Controls: state unemployment rate and state minimum wage.
State, interview year, and birth-year fixed effects included in all specifications.
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